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With a cryptographic root-of-trust for Internet routing
(RPKI [18]) on the horizon, we can finally start plan-
ning the deployment of one of the secure interdomain
routing protocols proposed over a decade ago (Secure
BGP [24], secure origin BGP [43]). However, if expe-
rience with IPv6 is any indicator, this will be no easy
task. Security concerns alone seem unlikely to provide
sufficient local incentive to drive the deployment process
forward. Worse yet, the security benefits provided by
the S*BGP protocols do not even kick in until a large
number of ASes have deployed them.
Instead, we appeal to ISPs’ interest in increasing rev-
enue-generating traffic. We propose a strategy that gov-
ernments and industry groups can use to harness ISPs’
local business objectives and drive global S*BGP de-
ployment. We evaluate our deployment strategy using
theoretical analysis and large-scale simulations on em-
pirical data. Our results give evidence that the market
dynamics created by our proposal can transition the
majority of the Internet to S*BGP.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), that sets up
routes from autonomous systems (ASes) to destinations
on the Internet, is amazingly vulnerable to attack [7].
Every few years, a new failure makes the news; ranging
from misconfigurations that cause an AS to become un-
reachable [37, 32], to possible attempts at traffic inter-
ception [11]. To remedy this, a number of widely-used
stop-gap measures have been developed to detect at-
tacks [22, 28]. The next step is to harden the system to
point where attacks can be prevented. After many years
of effort, we are finally seeing the initial deployment of
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [4, 38,
2, 29], a cryptographic root-of-trust for Internet rout-
ing that authoritatively maps ASes to their IP prefixes
and public keys. With RPKI on the horizon, we can
now realistically consider deploying the S*BGP proto-
cols, proposed a decade ago, to prevent routing failures
by validating AS-level paths: Secure BGP (S-BGP) [24]
and Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [43].
1.1 Economic benefits for S*BGP adoption.
While governments and industry groups may have an
interest in S*BGP deployment, ultimately, the Internet
lacks a centralized authority that can mandate the de-
ployment of a new secure routing protocol. Thus, a key
hurdle for the transition to S*BGP stems from the fact
that each AS will make deployment decisions according
to its own local business objectives.
Lessons from IPv6? Indeed, we have seen this prob-
lem before. While IPv6 has been ready for deployment
since around 1998, the lack of tangible local incentive for
IPv6 deployment means that we are only now starting
to see the seeds of large-scale adoption. Conventional
wisdom suggests that S*BGP will suffer from a similar
lack of local incentives for deployment. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that an AS cannot validate the
correctness of an AS-level path unless all the ASes on
the path deployed S*BGP. Thus, the security benefits
of S*BGP only apply after a large fraction of ASes have
already deployed the protocol.
Economic incentives for adoption. This paper
side steps these issues by showing that global S*BGP
deployment is possible even if ASes local deployment
decisions are not motivated by perceived improvements
in security. To this end, we present a prescriptive strat-
egy for S*BGP deployment that relies solely on Inter-
net Service Providers’ (ISPs) local economic incentives
to drive global deployment; namely, ISP’s interest in
attracting revenue-generating traffic to their networks.
1.2 A strategy for S*BGP deployment.
Our strategy is prescriptive (Section 2). We propose
guidelines for how (a) ASes should deploy S*BGP in
their networks, and (b) governments, industry groups,
and other interested parties should invest their resources
in order to drive S*BGP deployment forward.
1. Break ties in favor of secure paths. First,
we require ASes that deploy S*BGP to actually use it
to inform route selection. However, rather than requir-
ing security be the first criteria that ASes use to se-
lect routes, we only require secure ASes to break ties
between equally-good routes in favor of secure routes.
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This way, we create incentives for ISPs to deploy S*BGP
so they can transit more revenue-generating customer
traffic than their insecure competitors.
2. Make it easy for stubs to adopt S*BGP. 85%
of ASes in the Internet are stubs (i.e., ASes with no
customers) [9]. Because stubs earn no revenue from
providing Internet service, we argue for driving down
their deployment costs with a new idea from the In-
ternet standards community: simplex (unidirectional)
S*BGP. We require secure ISPs to be responsible for de-
ploying simplex S*BGP at each of their stub customers.
In practice, this means that simplex S*BGP must either
be extremely lightweight or heavily subsidized.
3. Create market pressure via early adopters.
We propose that governments and industry groups con-
centrate their regulatory efforts, subsidies, or financial
incentives, on convincing a small set of early adopters to
deploy S*BGP. We show that this set of early adopters
can create sufficient market pressure to convince a large
fraction of ASes to follow suit.
1.3 Evaluation: Model and simulations.
To evaluate our proposal, we needed a model of the
S*BGP deployment process.
Inspiration from social networks? At first glance,
it seems that the literature on technology adoption in
social networks would be applicable here [23, 42, 39,
44, 33, 19]. However, in social networks models, an
entity’s decision to adopt a technology depends only
on its immediate neighbors in the graph; in our set-
ting, this depends on the number of secure paths. This
complication means that many elegant results from this
literature have no analogues in our setting (Section 9).
Our model. In contrast to earlier work that assumes
that ASes deploy S*BGP because they are concerned
about security [8, 5], our model assumes that ISPs’ local
deployment decisions are based solely on their interest
in increasing customer traffic (Section 3).
We carefully designed our model to capture a few cru-
cial issues, including the fact that (a) traffic transited
by an ISP can include flows from any pair of source and
destination ASes, (b) a large fraction of Internet traffic
originates in a few large content provider ASes [27, 26],
and (c) the cost of S*BGP deployment can depend on
the size of the ISP’s network. The vast array of pa-
rameters and empirical data relevant to such a model
(Section 8) mean that our analysis is not meant to pre-
dict exactly how the S*BGP deployment process will
proceed in practice; instead, our goal was to evaluate
the efficacy of our S*BGP deployment strategy.
Theorems, simulations and examples. We ex-
plore S*BGP deployment in our model using a combina-
tion of theoretical analysis and simulations on empirical
AS-level graphs [9, 3] (Sections 5-7). Every example we
present comes directly from these simulations. Instead
of artificially reducing algorithmic complexity by sub-
sampling [25], we ran our simulations over the full AS
graph (Section 4). Thus, our simulations ran in time
O(N3) with N = 36K, and we devoted significant ef-
fort to developing parallel algorithms that we ran on a
200-node DryadLINQ cluster [45].
1.4 Key insights and recommendations.
Our evaluation indicates that our strategy for S*BGP
deployment can drive a transition to S*BGP (Section 5).
While we cannot predict exactly how S*BGP deploy-
ment will progress, a number of important themes emerge:
1. Market pressure can drive deployment. We
found that when S*BGP deployment costs are low, the
vast majority of ISPs have incentives to deploy S*BGP
in order to differentiate themselves from, or keep up
with, their competitors (Section 5). Moreover, our re-
sults show this holds even if 96% of routing decisions
(across all source-destination AS pairs) are not influ-
enced by security concerns (Section 6.6).
2. Simplex S*BGP is crucial. When deployment
costs are high, deployment is primarily driven by sim-
plex S*BGP (Section 6).
3. Choose a few well-connected early adopters.
The set of early adopters cannot be random; it should
include well-connected ASes like the Tier 1’s and con-
tent providers (Section 6). While we prove that it is
NP-hard to even approximate the optimal set of early
adopters (Section 6.1), our results show that even 5-10
early adopters suffice when deployment costs are low.
4. Prepare for incentives to disable S*BGP. We
show that ISPs can have incentives to disable S*BGP
(Section 7). Moreover, we prove that there could be de-
ployment oscillations (where ASes endlessly turn S*BGP
on and off), and that it is computationally hard to even
determine whether such oscillations exist.
5. Minimize attacks during partial deployment.
Even when S*BGP deployment progressed, 100% of ASes
never become secure (Section 5, 6). As such, we expect
that S*BGP and BGP will coexist in the long term,
suggesting that careful engineering is required to ensure
that this does not introduce new vulnerabilities into the
interdomain routing system.
Paper organization. Section 2 presents our pro-
posed strategy for S*BGP deployment. To evaluate the
proposal, we present a model of the deployment process
in Section 3. In Section 5-7 we explore this model us-
ing theoretical analysis and simulations, and present an
in-depth discussion of our modeling assumptions in Sec-
tion 8. Section 9 presents related work. The appendices
contains implementation details for our simulations and
proofs of all our theorems.
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2. S*BGP DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY
2.1 S*BGP: Two possible solutions.
With RPKI providing an authoritative mapping from
ASes to their cryptographic public keys, two main pro-
tocols have been proposed that prevent the propagation
of bogus AS paths information:
Secure BGP (S-BGP) [24]. S-BGP provides path
validation, allowing an AS a1 that receives a BGP an-
nouncement a1a2...akd to validate that every AS aj ac-
tually sent the BGP announcement in the path. With
S-BGP, a router must cryptographically sign every rout-
ing message that it sends, and cryptographically verify
every routing message that it receives.
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [43]. soBGP pro-
vides a slightly weaker security guarantee called topol-
ogy validation, that allows an AS to validate that a path
it learns physically exists in the network. To do this,
soBGP requires neighboring ASes to mutually authen-
ticate a certificate for the existence of a link between
them, and validate every path it learns from a BGP
announcement against these cryptographic certificates.
Because our study is indifferent to attacks and adver-
saries, it applies equally to each of these protocols. We
refer to them collectively as S*BGP, and an AS that
deploys them as secure.
2.2 How to standardize S*BGP deployment.
To create local economic incentives for ISPs to deploy
S*BGP, we propose that Internet standards should re-
quire ASes to deploy S*BGP as follows:
2.2.1 Simplex S*BGP for stubs.
About 85% of ASes in the Internet are stubs, ASes
with no customers of their own, typically corporations,
universities, and small residential providers that are In-
ternet consumers [9]. For stubs, Internet access is a cost,
rather than a revenue source, and it seems unlikely that
security concerns alone will suffice to motivate stubs to
undertake a costly S*BGP deployment. However, be-
cause stubs have no customers of their own, they prop-
agate only outgoing BGP announcements for their own
IP prefixes. Thus, the Internet standards community
has observed that stubs could deploy S*BGP in a uni-
directional (simplex) manner:
Simplex S-BGP. For S-BGP, this means that stubs
need only sign outgoing BGP announcements for their
own IP prefixes, but not validate incoming BGP an-
nouncements for other IP prefixes1. Thus, a stub need
only store its own public key (rather than obtaining the
1A stub may even choose to delegate its cryptographic keys
to its ISPs, and have them sign for him; while this might be
a good first step on the path to deployment, ceding control
of cryptographic keys comes at the cost of reduced security.
public keys of each AS on the Internet from the RPKI)
and cryptographically sign only a tiny fraction of the
BGP announcements it sees. Simplex S-BGP can sig-
nificantly decrease the computational load on the stub,
and can potentially be deployed as a software, rather
than hardware, upgrade to its routers.
Simplex soBGP. For soBGP, this means that a stub
need only create certificates for its links, but need not
need validate the routing announcements it sees. Sim-
plex soBGP is done offline; once a stub certifies his in-
formation in the soBGP database, its task is complete
and no router upgrade is required.
The objective of simplex S*BGP is to make it easy for
stubs to become secure by lowering deployment costs
and computational overhead. While we certainly allows
for stubs (e.g., banks, universities) with an interest in
security to move from simplex S*BGP to full S*BGP,
our proposal does not require them to do so.
Impact on security. With simplex S*BGP, a stub
lacks the ability to validate paths for prefixes other than
its own. Since stubs constitute about 85% of ASes [9],
a first glance suggests that simplex S*BGP leads to sig-
nificantly worse security in the global Internet.
We argue that this is not so. Observe that if a stub
s has an immediate provider p that has deployed S*BGP
and is correctly validating paths, then no false announce-
ments of fully secure paths can reach s from that provider,
unless p himself maliciously (or mistakenly) announces
false secure paths to s. Thus, in the event that stubs
upgrade to simplex S*BGP and all other ASes upgrade
to full S*BGP, the only open attack vector is for ISPs
to announce false paths to their own stub customers.
However, we observe the impact of a single misbehav-
ing ISP is small, since 80% of ISPs have less than 7 stub
customers, and only about 1% of ISPs have more than
100 stub customers [9]. Compare this to the insecure
status quo, where an arbitrary misbehaving AS can im-
pact about half of the ASes in the Internet (around 15K
ASes) on average [15].
2.2.2 Break ties in favor of fully secure paths.
In BGP, an AS chooses the path to a given destination
AS d based on a ranking on the outgoing paths it learns
from its neighbors (e.g., Appendix A). Paths are first
ranked according to interdomain considerations (local
preference, AS path length). Ties are then broken ac-
cording to intradomain considerations (geographic con-
siderations, router ID, etc.).
Secure paths. We say that a path is secure iff
every AS on that path is secure. We do this because
an AS cannot validate a path unless every AS on the
path signed the routing announcement (S-BGP) or is-
sued certificates for the links on the path (soBGP).
Security as part of route selection. The next
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part of our proposal suggests that once an AS has the
ability to validate paths, it should actually use this in-
formation to inform its routing decisions. In principle,
an AS might even modify its ranking on outgoing paths
so that security is its highest priority. Fortunately, we
need not go to such lengths. Instead, we only require
secure ASes to break ties between equally good inter-
domain paths in favor of secure paths. This empowers
secure ISPs to attract customer traffic away from their
insecure competitors. To ensure that a newly-secure AS
can regain lost customer traffic, we require that original
tie-break criteria (e.g., intradomain considerations) be
employed in the case of equally good, secure interdo-
main paths. Thus, the size of the set of equally-good
interdomain paths for a given source-destination pair
(which we call the tiebreak set) gives a measure of avail-
able competition in the AS graph.
Route selection at stubs. For stubs running
simplex S*BGP, we consider both the case where they
break ties in favor of secure paths (i.e., because they
trust their providers to verify paths for them) and the
case where they ignore security altogether (i.e., because
they do not verify paths) (Section 6.7).
Partially secure paths. We do not allow ASes
to prefer partially-secure paths over insecure paths, to
avoid introducing new attack vectors that do exist even
without S*BGP (e.g., attack in Appendix B).
We shall show that S*BGP deployment progresses quite
effectively even if stubs ignore security and tiebreak sets
are very small (Section 6.7-6.6).
2.3 How third parties should drive deployment.
Early adopters. To kick off the process, we suggest
that interested third parties (e.g., governments, regu-
lators, industry groups) focus regulation, subsidies, or
external financial incentives on convincing a set of early
adopter ASes to deploy S*BGP. Once these ASes be-
come secure, other ISPs should deploy S*BGP as a re-
sult of market pressure, i.e., to attract customer traffic.
ISPs upgrade their stubs. Next, we suggest
that a secure ISP should be responsible for upgrading
all its insecure stub customers to simplex S*BGP. To
achieve this, interested third parties should ensure that
simplex S*BGP is engineered to be as lightweight as
possible, and potentially provide additional subsidies for
ISPs that secure their stubs. (ISPs also have a local
incentives to secure stubs, i.e., to transit more revenue-
generating traffic for multi-homed stubs (Section 5.1).)
3. MODELING S*BGP DEPLOYMENT
We evaluate our proposal using a model of the S*BGP
deployment process. For brevity, we now present only
the details of our model. Justification for our modeling
decisions and possible extensions are in Section 8.
3.1 The Internetwork and entities.
The AS graph. The interdomain-routing system is
modeled with a labeled AS graph G(V,E). Each node
n ∈ V represents an AS, and each edge represents a
physical link between ASes. Per Figure 1, edges are an-
notated with the standard model for business relation-
ships in the Internet [13]: customer-provider (where the
customer pays the provider), and peer-to-peer (where
two ASes agree to transit each other’s traffic at no cost).
Each AS n is also assigned weight wn, to model the vol-
ume of traffic that originates at each AS.
We distinguish three types of ASes:
Content providers. Content providers (CPs) are
ASes whose revenue (e.g., advertising) depends on reli-
ably delivering their content to as many users as pos-
sible, rather than on providing Internet transit. While
a disproportionately large volume of Internet traffic is
known to originate at a few CPs, empirical data about
Internet traffic volumes remains notoriously elusive. Thus,
based on recent research [27, 26, 40] we picked five
content providers: Google (AS 15169), Facebook (AS
32934), Microsoft (AS 8075), Akamai (AS 20940), and
Limelight (AS 22822). Then, we assigned each CP
weight wCP , so that the five CPs originate an x fraction
of Internet traffic (equally split between them), with the
remaining 1− x split between the remaining ASes.
Stubs. Stubs are ASes that have no customers of their
own and are not CPs. Every stub s has unit weight
ws = 1. In Figure 1, ASes 34376 and 31420 are stubs.
ISPs. The remaining ASes in the graph (that are
not stubs or CPs) are ISPs. ISPs earn revenue by pro-
viding Internet service; because ISPs typically provide
transit service, rather that originating traffic (content),
we assume they have unit weight wn = 1. In Figure 1,
ASes 25076, 8866 and 8928 are ISPs.
3.2 The deployment process.
We model S*BGP deployment as an infinite round
process. Each round is represented with a state S, cap-
turing the set of ASes that have deployed S*BGP.
Initial state. Initially, the only ASes that are secure
are (1) the ASes in the set of early adopters and (2)
the direct customers of the early adopter ISPs that are
stubs. (The stubs run simplex S*BGP.) All other ASes
are insecure. For example, in Figure 1, early adopters
ISP 8866 and CP 22822 are secure, and stub 31420 runs
simplex S*BGP because its provider is secure.
Each round. In each round, every ISP chooses an
action (deploy S*BGP or not) that improves its utility
relative to the current state. We discuss the myopic
best-response strategy that ISPs use to choose their ac-
tions in Section 3.3. Once an ISP becomes secure, it
deploys simplex S*BGP at all its stub customers (Sec-
tion 2.3). Because CPs do not earn revenues by pro-
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Figure 1: Destinations (left) 31420, (right)
22822.
viding Internet service, some external incentive (e.g.,
concern for security, subsidies) must motivate them to
deploy S*BGP. Thus, in our model, a CP may only de-
ploy S*BGP if it is in the set of early adopters.
Once ASes choose their actions, paths are established
from every source AS i to every destination AS d, based
on the local BGP routing policies of each AS and the
state S of the AS graph. We use a standard model of
BGP routing policies, based on business relationships
and path length (see Appendix A). Per Section 2.3, we
also assume that routing policies of secure ASes require
them to break ties by preferring fully secure paths over
insecure ones, so that the path to a given destination d
depends on the state S. Paths to a destination d form
a tree rooted at d, and we use the notation Tn(d, S) to
represent the subtree of ASes routing through AS n to
a destination d when the deployment process is in state
S. Figure 1 (right) shows part of the routing tree for
destination 22822; notice that T8866(22822, S) contains
ASes 31420, 25076, 34376.
Termination. We proceed until we reach a stable
state, where no ISP wants to deploy (or disable) S*BGP.
3.3 ISP utility and best response.
We model an ISP’s utility as related to the volume of
traffic it transits for its customers; this captures the fact
that many ISPs either bill their customers directly by
volume, or indirectly through flat rates for fixed traffic
capacities. Utility is a function of the paths chosen by
each AS. Because path selection is a function of routing
policies (Appendix A) and the state S, it follows that
the utility of each ISP is completely determined by the
AS weights, AS graph topology, and the state S.
We have two models of ISP utility that capture the
ways in which an ISP can transit customer traffic:
Outgoing utility. ISP n can increase its utility by
forwarding traffic to its customers. Thus, we define out-
going utility as the amount of traffic that ISP n routes
to each destination d via a customer edge. Letting D̂(n)







i ∈ Tn(d, S)
wi (1)
Let’s use Figure 1 to find the incoming utility of ISP
n = 8866 due to destinations 31420 and 22822. Des-
tination 31420 is in D̂(n) but destination 22822 is not.
Thus, two CPs (Google AS 15169 and Limelight 22822),
and 3 other ASes (i.e., AS 8928, 25076, 34376) transit
traffic through n = 8866 to destination d = 31420, con-
tributing a 2wCP + 3 outgoing utility to n = 8866.
Incoming utility. An ISP n can increase its utility
by forwarding traffic from its customers. Thus, we de-
fine incoming utility as the amount of traffic that ISP
n receives via customer edges for each destination d.
Thus, restrict the subtree Tn(d, S) to branches that are
incident on n via customer edges to obtain the customer







i ∈ T̂n(d, S)
wi (2)
Let’s compute outgoing utility of n = 8866 due to des-
tinations 31420 and 22822 in Figure 1. For destination
31420, ASes 25076 and 34376 are part of the customer
subtree T̂n(d, S), but 15169, 8928 and 22822 are not.
For destination d = 22822, ASes 31420, 25076, 34376
are part of the customer subtree. Thus, these ASes
contribute 2 + 3 incoming utility to ISP n = 8866.
Realistically, ISP utility is some function of both of
these models; to avoid introducing extra parameters
into our model, we consider each separately.
Myopic best response. We use a standard game-
theoretic update rule known as myopic best response,
that produces the most favorable outcome for a node in
the next round, taking other nodes’ strategies as given
[17]. Let (¬Sn, S−n) denote the state when n ‘flips’ to
the opposite action that it used in state S, while other
ASes maintain the same action they use in state S. ISP
n changes its action in state S iff its projected utility
un(¬Sn, S−n) is sufficiently high, i.e.,
un(¬Sn, S−n) > (1 + θ) · un(S) (3)
where θ is a threshold denoting the increase in utility an
ISP needs to see before it is willing to change its actions.
Threshold θ captures the cost of deploying BGP secu-
rity; e.g., an ISP might deploy S*BGP in a given round
if S*BGP deployment costs do not exceed θ = 5% of the
profit it earns from transiting customer traffic. Since θ
is multiplicative, it captures the idea that deployment
costs are likely to be higher at ISPs that transit more
traffic. The update rule is myopic, because it focuses on
increasing ISP n’s utility in the next round only. It is
best-response because it does not require ISP n to spec-
ulate on other ASes’ actions in future rounds; instead,
n takes these actions as given by the current state S.
Discussion. Our update rule requires ASes to predict
their future utility. In our model, ASes have full infor-
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mation of S and G, a common approach in game theory,
which enables them to project their utility accurately.
We discuss the consequences of our update rule, and the
impact of partial information in Sections 8.1-8.2.
4. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
Computing utility un(S) and projected utility un(¬Sn, S−n)
requires us to determine the path from every source
AS to every destination AS, for every ISP n’s unique
projected state (¬Sn, S−n). Thus, our simulations had
complexity O(|V |3) on an AS graph G(V,E). To ac-
curately simulate our model, we chose not to ‘sample
down’ the complexity of our simulations:
Projecting utility for each ISP. If we had com-
puted the utility for only a few sampled ISPs, this would
reduce the number of available secure paths and artifi-
cially prevent S*BGP deployment from progressing.
Simulations over the entire AS graph. Our pro-
posal is specifically designed to leverage the extreme
skew in AS connectivity (i.e., many stubs with no cus-
tomers, few Tier 1s with many customers), to drive
S*BGP deployment. To faithfully capture the impact
of this skew, we computed utility over traffic from all
sources to all destination ASes. Furthermore, we ran
our simulations on the full empirical AS graph [9], rather
than a subsampled version [25], or a smaller synthetic
topology (e.g., BRITE [30], GT-ITM [46]), as in prior
work [8, 5]. We used the Cyclops AS graph from Dec
9, 2010 [9], augmented with an additional 16K peering
edges discovered at Internet exchange points (IXPs) [3],
as well as an additional augmented AS graph described
in Section 6.8. (See also Appendix D.)
The AS graph G(V,E) had |V | = 36K; to run O(|V |3)-
simulations at such a scale, we parallelized our algo-
rithms on a 200-node DryadLINQ cluster [45] that could
run through a single simulation in 1-12 hours. (Details
of our implementation are in Appendix C.)
5. CASE STUDY: S*BGP DEPLOYMENT
We start by showing that even a small set of early
adopters can create enough market pressure to transi-
tion the vast majority of ASes to S*BGP.
Case study overview. We focus on a single
simulation where the early adopters are the five CPs
(Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Limelight, Akamai, see
Section 3.1), and the top five Tier 1 ASes in terms of
degree ( Sprint (1239), Verizon (701), AT&T (7018),
Level 3 (3356), Cogent (174)). Every ISP uses an up-
date rule with a relatively low threshold θ = 5%, that
the five CPs originate x = 10% of the traffic in the
Internet, and that stubs do break ties in favor of se-
cure routes. We now show how even a small set of ten
early adopters (accounting for less that 0.03% of the AS
1239 1239 1239






Round 4   
Figure 2: A Diamond: ISPs 13789 and 8359
compete for traffic from Tier 1 AS 1239.
Table 1: Occurrences of the Diamond scenario
for early adopter ASes (sorted by degree).
Tier 1s AS 174 878 CPs AS 22822 175
AS 3356 1,400 AS 15169 892
AS 7018 340 AS 20940 178
AS 701 706 AS 8075 1,149
AS 1239 728 AS 32934 82
graph) can convince 85% of ASes to deploy S*BGP, and
secure 65% of all paths in the AS graph.
5.1 Competition drives deployment.
We start by zooming in on S*BGP deployment at two
competing ISPs, in a scenario we call a Diamond.
Figure 2: Two ISPs, AS 8359 and AS 13789, compete
for traffic from Sprint (AS 1239) to their stub customer,
AS 18608. Sprint is an early adopter of S*BGP, and
initially the three other ASes are insecure. Both ISPs
offer Sprint equally good two-hop customer paths to the
stub, and AS 8359 is chosen to carry traffic by winning
the tie break. In the first round, AS 13789 computes its
projected utility, and realizes it can gain Sprint’s traffic
by adopting S*BGP and upgrading its stub to simplex
S*BGP. (See Section 8.2 for more discussion on how
ISPs compute projected utility.) By the fourth round,
AS 8359 has lost so much utility (due to traffic lost to
ASes like 13789) that he decides to deploy S*BGP.
Of course, Figure 2 is only a very small snapshot of
the competition for traffic destined to a single stub AS
18608; utility for each ISPs is based on customer traffic
transited to all destinations in the AS graph. Indeed,
this Diamond scenario is quite common. In Table 1,
we summarize the number of diamonds we counted,
each involving at two ISPs, a stub and one of the early
adopters.
5.2 Global deployment dynamics.
Next, we look at deployment globally:
Figure 3: We show the number of ASes (i.e., stubs,
ISPs and CPs) and the number of ISPs that deploy
S*BGP at each round of the simulation. In the first
round, 548 ISPs become secure; because each of these
ISPs deploy simplex S*BGP in their stubs, we see that
over 5K ASes become secure by the end of the first
round. In subsequent rounds, hundreds of ISPs deploy
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Figure 3: The number of ASes
that deploy S*BGP each round.






































Figure 4: Normalized utility of
ISPs in Fig. 2 and 7.





























Figure 5: Projected and actual
utility before deploying S*BGP
normalized by starting utility.
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Figure 6: Cumulative fraction of ISPs that de-
ploy S*BGP by degree.
secure stubs drops dramatically, suggesting that many
ISPs deploy S*BGP to regain traffic lost when their
stubs were secured by competitors. After the 17th iter-
ation, the process tapers off, with fewer than 50 ASes
becoming secure in each round. The final surge in de-
ployment occurs in round 25, when a large AS, 6939,
suddenly became secure, causing a total of 436 ASes to
deploy S*BGP in the remaining six rounds. When the
process terminates, 85% of ASes are secure, including
80% of the 6K ISPs in the AS graph.
5.3 Impact of ISP degree on deployment.
The reader might be surprised to find that ISPs with
high degree are more likely to deploy S*BGP:
Figure 6: We consider the cumulative fraction of
ISPs adopting S*BGP in each round, separated by de-
gree. Interestingly, ISPs with low degree (≤ 10) are less
likely to become secure. Indeed, we found a consistent
set of about 1000 ISPs that never deploy S*BGP in any
of our simulations (not shown). These ISPs had aver-
age degree 6, and remained insecure because they never
had to compete for customer traffic; indeed, they were
usually providers to only single-homed stub customers.
1239 1239





Round 4 Round 5
Figure 7: A newly created four-hop secure path.
5.4 Longer secure paths sustain deployment.
In Figure 3 we observed rapid, sustained deployment
of S*BGP in the first 17 iterations. This happens be-
cause longer secure paths are created as more ASes
deploy S*BGP, thus creating incentives for S*BGP at
ASes that are far away from the early adopters:
Figure 7: We once again encounter AS 8359 from
Figure 2. We show how AS 8359’s decision to deploy
S*BGP in round 4 allows a new ISP (AS 6371) to com-
pete for traffic. In round 5 AS 6731 sees a large in-
crease in utility by becoming secure. This occurs, in
part, because AS 6371 can now entice six of the early
adopters to route through him on a total of 69 newly-
secure paths. Indeed, when AS 6731 becomes secure, he
continues the chain reaction set in motion by AS 8359;
for instance, in round 7 (not shown), AS 6371’s neigh-
bor AS 41209 becomes secure in order to offer Sprint a
new, secure four-hop path to one of 41209’s own stubs.
5.5 Keeping up with the competition.
Two behaviors drive S*BGP deployment in a Dia-
mond. First, an ISP becomes secure to steal traffic
from a competitor, and then the competitor becomes
secure in order to regain the lost traffic. We can watch
this happening for the ISPs from Figure 2 and 7:
Figure 4: We show the utilities of ISPs 8359, 6731,
and 8342 in each round, normalized by starting util-
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ity i.e., the utility before the deployment process be-
gan (when all ASes, including the early adopters, were
still insecure). As we saw in Figure 2, AS 8359 deploys
S*BGP in round 4 in order to regain traffic he lost to
his secure competitors; here we see that in round 4, AS
8359 has lost 3% of his starting utility. Once AS 8359
deploys S*BGP, his utility jumps up to more than 125%
of his starting utility, but these gains in utility are only
temporary, disappearing around round 15. The same is
true in round 6 for AS 6371 from Figure 7. By round 15,
60% ISPs in the AS graph are already secure (Figure 3),
and our ISPs can no longer use security to differentiate
themselves, causing their utility to return to within 3%
of their starting utility.
This is also true more generally:
Figure 5: For each round i, we show the median util-
ity and median projected utility for ISPs that become
secure in round i+1, each normalized by starting utility.
(Recall from (3) that these ISPs have projected utility
at least 1+θ times their utility in round i.) In the first 9
rounds, ISPs mainly deploy S*BGP to steal traffic from
competitors; that is, their projected utility in the round
before they deploy S*BGP is at least 1 + θ = 105%
times their starting utility. However, as deployment
progresses, ASes increasingly deploy S*BGP in order to
recover lost traffic and return to their starting utility;
that is, in rounds 10-20 ISP utility drops to at least
θ = 5% less than starting utility, while projected utility
approaches starting utility (y=1).
5.6 Is S*BGP deployment a zero-sum game?
Our model of S*BGP deployment is indeed a zero-
sum game; we assume that ISPs compete over a fixed
set of customer traffic. Thus, when the vast majority
of ASes have deployed S*BGP, ISPs can no longer use
security to distinguish themselves their from competi-
tors (Figure 4). At the termination of this case study,
only 8% of ISPs have an increase in utility of more than
θ = 5% over their starting utility. On the other hand,
85% of ASes now benefit from a (mostly) secure Inter-
net. Furthermore, like ASes 8359 and 6731 in Figure 4,
many of these secure ASes enjoyed a prolonged period
of increased utility that could potentially help defray
the costs of deploying S*BGP.
It is better to deploy S*BGP. One might argue
that a cynical ISP might preempt the process by never
deploying S*BGP. However, a closer look shows that
its almost always in the ISPs interest to deploy S*BGP.
ISPs that deploy S*BGP usually return to their starting
utility or slightly above, whereas ISPs that do not de-
ploy S*BGP lose traffic in the long term. For instance,
AS 8342 in Figure 7 never deploys S*BGP. As shown
in Figure 4, when the deployment process terminates,
AS 8342 has lost 4% of its starting utility. Indeed, an-
other look at the data (not shown) shows that the ISPs
that remain insecure when the process terminates lose
on average 13% of their starting utility!
6. CHOOSING EARLY ADOPTERS
Next, we consider choosing the set of ASes that should
be targeted to become early adopters of S*BGP.
6.1 It’s hard to choose early adopters.
Ideally, we would like to choose the optimal set of
early adopters that could cause the maximum number
of other ASes to deploy S*BGP. We show that this is
NP-hard, by presenting a reduction to the ‘set cover’
problem (proof in Appendix E):
Theorem 6.1. For an AS graph G(V,E) and a pa-
rameter 1 ≤ k ≤ |V |, finding a set of early adopter
ASes of size k that maximizes the number of ASes that
are secure when the deployment process terminates is
NP-hard. Approximating the solution within a constant
factor is also NP-hard.
As such, we use simulations of the deployment process
to investigate heuristic approaches for choosing early
adopters, including AS degree (e.g., Tier 1s should be
early adopters) and volume of traffic originated by an
AS (e.g., content providers should be early adopters).
6.2 The parameter space.
We consider how the choice of early adopters is im-
pacted by assumptions on (1) whether or not stubs run-
ning simplex S*BGP break ties based on security, (2)
the AS graph, and (3) traffic volumes sourced by CPs.
Outgoing utility. Also, recall that we have two mod-
els of ISP utility (Section 3.3). In this section, we dive
into the details of the outgoing utility model because it
has the following very nice property:
Theorem 6.2. In the outgoing utility model, a secure
node will never have an incentive to turn off S*BGP.
As a consequence of this theorem (proof in Appendix H),
it immediately follows that (a) every simulation must
terminate, and (b) we can significantly reduce compute
time by not computing projected utility for ISPs that
are already secure. (We discuss complications that arise
from the incoming utility model in Section 7.)
Deployment threshold θ. Our update rule (3)
is such that ISPs change their actions if they can in-
creases utility by at least θ. Thus, to gain insight into
how ‘difficult’ it is to convince ISPs to deploy S*BGP,
we assume that each ISP uses the same threshold θ,
and sweep through different values of θ (but see also
Section 8.2).
6.3 Comparing sets of early adopters.
We next explore the influence of different early adopters:
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Figure 8: Fraction of ASes (a) and ISPs (b) that
deploy S*BGP for varying θ and early adopters.
Figure 8 (a): We show the fraction of ASes that
adopt S*BGP for different values of θ. We consider no
early adopters, the top 5-200 ISPs in terms of degree,
the five CPs, five CPs in combination with the top five
ISPs, and 200 random ISPs.
There are incentives to deploy S*BGP. For low
values of θ < 5%, we observe that there is sufficient
competition over customer traffic to transition 85% of
ASes to S*BGP. Moreover, this holds for almost every
set of early adopters we considered. (Note that in the
unrealistic case where θ = 0, we see widespread S*BGP
deployment even with no early adopters, because we
assume the stubs break ties in favor of secure paths.
But see also Section 6.7.) Furthermore, we find that
the five CPs have approximately the same amount of
influence as the case where there are no early adopters;
we investigate this in more detail in Section 6.8.
Some ISPs always remain insecure. We find





































Figure 9: Fraction of paths on the Internet that
are secure.
20% of the 6K ISPs in the AS graph [9, 3] never deploy
S*BGP, because they are never subject to competition
for customer traffic. This highlights two important is-
sues: (1) some ISPs may never become secure (e.g.,
ASes whose customers are exclusively single-homed) (2)
S*BGP and BGP will coexist in the long term.
Choice of early adopters is critical. For higher
values of θ ≥ 10%, it becomes important to choose ISPs
with high customer degree as early adopters. In fact,
Figure 8 shows a set of 200 random ASes has signif-
icantly lower influence than a set containing only the
five top ASes in terms of degree. For large values of
θ ≥ 30%, a larger set of high-degree early adopters is
required, with the top 200 ASes in terms of degree caus-
ing 53% of the ASes to deploy S*BGP for θ = 50%.
However, to put this observation in some perspective,
recall that θ = 30% suggests that the cost of S*BGP
deployment exceeds 30% of an ISP’s profit margin from
transiting customer traffic.
6.4 How much security do we get?
We count the number of secure paths at the termi-
nation of the deployment process, as a measure of the
efficacy of the S*BGP deployment process. (Of course,
this is not a perfect measure of the AS graph’s resiliency
to attack; quantifying this requires approaches similar
to [15, 8], an important direction for future work.)
Figure 9: We show the fraction of the (36K)2 paths
between ASes that are secure, for the different sets of
early adopters. As expected, we find that the fraction
of secure path is only slightly lower than f2, where f is
the fraction of ASes that have deployed S*BGP. (The f2
follows from the fact that for a path to be secure, both
its source AS and its destination AS must be secure.)
Indeed, the fact the number of secure paths is only 4%
lower than f2 suggests that the majority of secure paths























































































Figure 10: Probability density function of tie
break set size in the AS graph [9, 3] for different
source-destination pairs (log-log scale).
6.5 Market pressure vs. simplex S*BGP
The cause of for global S*BGP deployment differs for
low and high values of the deployment threshold θ:
Figure 8 (b): We show the fraction of ISPs (not
ASes) that deploy S*BGP for the early adopter sets and
varying values of θ. For low values of θ, market pres-
sure drives a large fraction of ISPs to deploy S*BGP.
In contrast, for higher values of θ very few ISPs de-
ploy S*BGP, even for large sets of well-connected early
adopters. In these cases, most of the deployment is
driven by ISPs upgrading their stub customers to sim-
plex S*BGP. For example, for the top 200 ISPs, when
θ = 50%, only a small fraction of secure ASes (4%) de-
ploy S*BGP because of market pressure, the vast ma-
jority (96%) are stubs running simplex S*BGP.
6.6 The source of competition: tie break sets.
Recall that the tiebreak set is the set of paths from
which an source AS employs the security criterion to
select paths to a destination AS (Section 2.2.2). A
tiebreak set with multiple paths presents opportunities
for ISPs to compete over traffic from the source AS.
Figure 10: We show distribution of tiebreak set size
for all source-destination pairs of ASes. (This result
holds for the AS graph [9, 3] under the assumption that
ASes use the routing policies of Appendix A.) Noting
that this graph has a log-log scale, observe that tiebreak
sets are typically very small. ISPs have slightly larger
tiebreak sets than stubs: an average of 1.30 for ISPs and
1.16 for stubs. Moreover, only 20% tiebreak sets con-
tain more than a single path. This striking observation
suggests that even a very limited amount of competition
suffices to drive S*BGP deployment for low θ. Further-
more, we speculate that this might also explain why
there is limited market pressure for S*BGP deployment














































Figure 11: Fraction of ASes that deploy S*BGP
for different early adopters (dashed lines stubs
do not prefer secure paths).
at ISPs when θ > 10%.
6.7 Stubs don’t need to break ties on security.
So far, we have focused on the case where secure stubs
break ties in favor of secure paths. Indeed, given that
stubs typically make up the majority of secure ASes,
one might expect that their routing decisions can have
a major impact of the success of the S*BGP deployment
process. Surprisingly, we find that this is not the case.
Indeed, our results are insensitive to this assumption,
for θ > 0 and regardless of the choice of early adopters
(Figure 11). We explain this by observing that stubs
both (a) have small tiebreak sets, and (b) transit no
traffic.
Security need only effect a fraction of routing
decisions! Thus, only 15% of ASes (i.e., the ISPs)
need to break ties in favor of secure routes, and only
23% of ISP tiebreak sets contain more than one path.
Combining these observations, we find that S*BGP de-
ployment can progress even if only 0.15×0.23 = 3.5% of
routing decisions are effected by security considerations!
6.8 Content providers vs. Tier 1s.
We compare the Tier 1s and CPs as early adopters.
6.8.1 Varying parameters.
To do this effectively, we varied a few parameters:
1. Traffic volumes. We swept through different
values x = {10%, 20%, 33%, 50%} for the fraction of
traffic originated by the five CPs (Section 3.1); recent
work suggests a reasonable range is x =10-20% [27, 26].
2. Connectivity of content providers. Pub-
lished AS-level topologies are known to have poor vis-
ibility into peering links at the edge of the AS-level
topology [34]. This is particularly problematic for CPs,
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Figure 12: Fraction of ASes that deploy S*BGP
for the five content providers and five Tier 1s in
the augmented topology.
because they peer with many other ASes to cut down
costs of delivering content [14]. Indeed, while the CPs
known to have short path lengths [35], their average
path length in our AS graph (with routing policies as in
Appendix A) was 2.7 hops or more. Thus, for sensitiv-
ity analysis, we created an augmented AS graph with
an additional 19.7K peering edges from the five CPs to
80% of ASes found to be present at IXPs [3]. In our
new ‘augmented AS graph’, (described in Appendix D)
the average path length of the CPs dropped to about 2,
and their degree increased to be as high as the largest
Tier 1 ISPs.
6.8.2 Impact of connectivity and traffic volumes.
Figure 12: We sweep through values of θ to compare
the five CPs and top five Tier 1s as early adopters for
(a) different traffic volumes, (b) in our augmented AS
graph vs. the original graph. We find the following:
1. Traffic volumes vs. degree. We were initially sur-
prised to find that when the five CPs source x = 10%
of traffic, they are much less effective as early adopters
than the top five Tier 1 ASes. Even though the Tier 1s
and CPs have about equal degree, it turns out the dom-
inant factor here is traffic volume; even though the CPs
originate the majority (x = 10%) of traffic, the Tiers 1s
still transit 2-9X times more traffic. As x increases to
50%, the Tier 1s only transit 0.3-1.2X more traffic than
is originated by the CPs. Thus, the CPs tend to have
more influence for lower values of θ ≤ 10%.
2. Tier 1s deploy simplex S*BGP at more stubs. Fig-
ure 12 indicates the five Tier 1 consistently outperform
the CPs as early adopters when θ ≥ 0.3. The expla-
nation for this is simple; Tier 1s have a large number
of stub customers that they immediately upgrade to








Figure 13: AS 4755 incentives turn off S*BGP.
grade their stub peers to simplex S*BGP could poten-
tially drive S*BGP deployment further.
6.9 Summary and recommendations.
We make two key observations regarding selection of
early adopters. First, only a small number of ISPs suf-
fice as early adopters when deployment thresholds θ are
small. Second, to withstand high θ, Tier 1 ASes should
be targeted. This is due to the high volumes of traffic
they transit and the many stubs they upgrade to sim-
plex S*BGP. Finally, we note that our results hold even
if more than 96% of routing decisions are insensitive to
security considerations!
7. OTHER COMPLICATIONS
Intuition suggests that a secure ISP will observe in-
creased utility because secure ASes transit traffic through
it. While this is true in the outgoing utility model (The-
orem 6.2), it turns out that this is not the case for the
incoming utility model. We now discuss complications
that might arise because we require S*BGP to play a
role in route selection.
7.1 Buyer’s Remorse: Turning off S*BGP.
We present an example of a severe obstacle to S*BGP
deployment: an secure ISP that has incentive to turn off
S*BGP. The idea here is that when an ISP n becomes
secure, some of n’s incoming traffic might change its
path, and enter n’s network along peer/provider edges
instead of customer edges, thus reducing n’s utility.
Figure 13: We show that AS 4755, a Telecom
provider in India, has an incentive to turn off S*BGP in
its network. We assume content providers have wCP =
821 which corresponds to 10% of Internet traffic origi-
nating at the big five CPs (including Akamai’s AS 20940).
In the state S on the left, Akamai, AS 4755, and NTT
(AS 2914) are secure, the stub customers of these two
secure ISPs run simplex S*BGP, and all other ASes are
insecure. Here, AS 4755 transits traffic sourced by Aka-
mai from his provider NTT AS 2914, to a collection of
twenty-four of its stub customers (including AS 45210).
Akamai’s traffic does not increase AS 4755’s utility be-
cause it arrives at AS 4755 along a provider edge.
In the state (¬S4755, S−4755) on the right, AS 4755
turns S*BGP off. If we assume that stubs running sim-
plex S*BGP do not break ties based on security, then
the only ASes that could potentially change their routes
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are the secure ASes 20940 and 2914. Notice that when
AS 4755 turns S*BGP off, Akamai’s AS 20940 has no
secure route to AS 4755’s stub customers (including AS
45210). As such, Akamai will run his usual tie break
algorithms, which in our simulation came up in favor
of AS 9498, a customer of AS 4755. Because Akamai’s
traffic is now enters AS 4755 on customer edges, AS
4755’s incoming utility increases by a factor of 205%
per each of the 24 stub destinations.
Turning off the entire network. Our simulations
confirmed that, apart from Akamai changing the path
it uses to these twenty-four stubs, all other ASes use
the same routes in state S and state (¬S4755, S−4755).
This means that AS 4755 has an incentive to turn off
S*BGP in his entire network ; no routes other than those
ones Akamai uses to reach the twenty-four stubs are
impacted by his decision. Indeed, we found that the
utility of AS 4755 increase by a total of 0.5% (over all
destinations) when he turns off S*BGP!
Turning off a destination. AS 4775 could just as
well turn off S*BGP on a per destination basis, i.e., by
refusing to propagate S*BGP announcements for the
twenty-four stubs in Figure 13, and sending insecure
BGP messages for these destinations instead.
7.2 Turning off S*BGP can cause oscillations.
To underscore the seriousness of an ISP turning off
S*BGP in his entire network, we now argue that a
group of ISPs could oscillate, alternating between turn-
ing S*BGP on and off, and never arriving at a stable
state. In Appendix F, we exhibit an example AS graph
and state S that proves that oscillations could exist.
Worse yet, we show that it is hard to even determine
whether or not the deployment process will oscillate!
Theorem 7.1. Given an AS graph and state S, it is
PSPACE-complete to decide if the deployment process
will terminate at a stable state in the incoming utility
model.
Our proof, in Appendix K is by reduction to the PSPACE-
complete problem of determining whether a space-bounded
Turing Machine will halt for a given input string. The
complexity class PSPACE consists of all decisions prob-
lems that can be solved using only polynomial space,
but in unbounded time. PSPACE-complete problems
(intuitively, the hardest problems in PSPACE) are at
least as hard as the NP-complete problems, and widely
believed to be even harder.
7.3 How common are these examples?
At this point, the reader may be wondering how often
an AS might have incentives to turn off S*BGP.
Turning off an entire network? Figure 13 proves
that cases where an ISP has an incentive to turn off
S*BGP in its entire network do exist in realistic AS-
level topologies [9]. However, we speculate that such
examples will occur infrequently in practice. While we
cannot provide any concrete evidence of this, our specu-
lation follows from the fact that an ISP n obtains utility
from many destinations. Thus, even if n has increased
its utility by turning OFF S*BGP for destinations that
are part of subgraphs like Figure 13, he will usually ob-
tain higher utility by turning ON S*BGP for the other
destinations that are not part of such subgraphs. (In
Figure 13, this does not happen because the state S is
such that only a very small group of ASes are secure;
thus, no routes other than the ones pictured are effected
by AS 4755’s decision to turn off S*BGP.)
Turning off a destination is likely. On the other
hand, it is quite easy to find examples of specific desti-
nations for which an ISP might want to turn off S*BGP.
Indeed, a search through the empirical AS graph found
that at least 10% of the 5,992 ISPs could find them-
selves in a state where they have incentives to turn off
S*BGP for at least one destination!
8. DISCUSSION FOR OUR MODEL
The wide range of parameters involved in modeling
S*BGP deployment means that our model (Section 3)
cannot be predictive of S*BGP deployment in practice.
Instead, our model was designed to (a) capture a few of
the most crucial issues that might drive S*BGP deploy-
ment, while (b) taking the approach that simplicity is
preferable to complexity.
8.1 Myopic best response.
For simplicity, we used a myopic best-response up-
date rule that is standard in the game-theory literature
[17]. In Section 5.6, we discussed the consequences of
the fact that ISPs only act to improve their utility in
the next round, rather than in long run. Another poten-
tial issue is that our update rule ignores the possibility
that multiple ASes could deploy S*BGP in the tran-
sition from a round i to round i + 1, resulting in the
gap between the projected utility, and the actual utility
in the subsequent round. Fortunately, our simulations
show projected utility un(¬Sn, S−n) is usually an excel-
lent estimate of actual utility in the subsequent round.
For example, in the case study of Section 5, 80% of ISPs
overestimate their utility by less than 2%, 90% of ISPs
overestimate by less than 6.7%. This observation also
holds more generally across simulations:
Figure 14: We show the projected utility normal-
ized by the utility nodes observed once they deployed
S*BGP for different sets of early adopters when θ = 0.
In most cases ASes projected utilities that are within a
few percentage points of what they actually received in
the next round.
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Figure 14: Projected utility normalized by ac-
tual utility after an AS deploys S*BGP.
8.2 Computing utility locally.
Because we lack information about interdomain traf-
fic flows in the Internet, our model uses weighted counts
of the subtrees of ASes routing through ISP n as a
stand-in for traffic volumes, and thus ISP utility. While
computing these subtrees in our model requires global
information that would be unavailable to the average
ISP (e.g., the state S, the AS graph topology, routing
policies), in practice, an ISP can just compute its utility
by locally observing traffic flows through its network.
Computing projected utility. Computing pro-
jected utility un(¬Sn, S−n) in practice is significantly
more complex. While projected utility gives an accu-
rate estimate of actual utility when it is computed us-
ing global information, ISPs may inaccurately estimate
their projected utility when using only local informa-
tion. Our model can accommodate these inaccuracies
by rolling them into the deployment threshold θ. (That
is, if projected utility is off by a factor of ±ε, model
this with threshold θ ± ε.) Thus, while our approach
was to sweep through a common value of θ for every
ISP (Section 6.2), extensions might capture inaccurate
estimates of projected utility by randomizing θ, or even
by systematically modeling an ISP’s estimation process
to obtain a measure for how it impacts θ.
Practical mechanisms for projecting future traf-
fic patterns. Because S*BGP deployment can im-
pact route selection, it is crucial to develop mechanisms
that allow ISPs predict how security will impact traffic
patterns through it’s network. Moreover, if ISPs could
use such mechanisms to estimate projected utility, they
would also be an important driver for S*BGP deploy-
ment. For example, an ISP might set up a router that
listens to S*BGP messages from neighboring ASes, and
then use these message to predict how becoming secure
might impact its neighbors’ route selections. A more
sophisticated mechanism could use extended “shadow
configurations” with neighboring ASes [1] to gain visi-
bility into how traffic flows might change.
8.3 Alternate routing policies and actions.
Routing policies. Because our model of ISP utility
depends on traffic volumes (Section 3.3), we need to a
model for how traffic flows in the Internet. In practice,
traffic flow is determined by the local routing policies
used by each AS, which are arbitrary and not publicly
known. Thus, we use a standard model of routing poli-
cies (Appendix A) based on business relationship and
path length [15, 6].
Routing policies are likely to impact our results by de-
termining (a) AS path lengths (longer AS paths mean
it is harder to secure routes), and (b) tiebreak set size
(Section 6.6). For example, we speculate that consid-
ering shortest path routing policy would lead to overly
optimistic results; shortest-path routing certainly lead
to shorter AS paths, and possibly also to larger tiebreak
sets. On the other hand, if a large fraction of mul-
tihomed ASes always use one provider as primary and
the other as backup (irrespective of the AS path lengths
etc.) then our current analysis is likely to be overly op-
timistic. (Of course, modeling this is difficult given a
dearth of empirical data on backup paths).
Choosing routing policies. An AS might cleverly
choose its routing policies to maximize utility. However,
the following suggests that this is intractable:
Theorem 8.1. When all other ASes’ routing policies
are as in Appendix A, it is NP hard for any AS n to find
the routing policy that maximizes its utility (in both the
incoming and outgoing utility models). Moreover, ap-
proximating the optimal routing policy within any con-
stant factor is also NP hard.
The proof (in Appendix I) shows that this is NP-hard
even if n has a single route to the destination, and must
only choose the set of neighbors to which it announces
the route. (Thus, the problem is tractable when the
node’s neighbors set is of constant size.)
Per-link S*BGP deployment. An ISP might be
able to optimize its utility by turning ON S*BGP on a
per link basis, i.e., with only a subset of its neighbors.
(For instance, a second look at Figure 13 suggests that
AS 4775 improve his utility by turning off S*BGP on
the link to his provider AS 2914.) Once again, this is
intractable when an ISP has a large number of neighbors
(Proof in Appendix J ):
Theorem 8.2. Given an AS graph and state S, it is
NP-hard to choose the set of neighbors for which ISP
n should deploy S*BGP so as to maximize its incoming
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utility. Moreover, approximating the optimum within
any constant factor is also NP hard.
Lying and cheating. While it is well known that
an AS can increase the amount of traffic it transits by
manipulating its BGP messages [7], we avoided this
issue because our focus is on technology adoption by
economically-motivated ASes, not BGP manipulations
by malicious or misconfigured ASes.
8.4 Other extensions to our model.
Static AS graph. Our model of interdomain routing
assumes that the AS graph does not change. Because
the time-scale of the deployment process can be quite
large (e.g., years), extensions to our model might also
model the evolution of the AS graph with time, and
possible incorporate issues like the addition of new edges
if secure ASes manage to sign up new customers.
Mapping revenue to traffic volume. Our model
of ISP utility is based on the idea that revenue is related
to the total volume of customer traffic the ISP transits.
In practice, ISPs may use a variety of pricing policies,
e.g., by volume, flat rates based on discrete units of ca-
pacity. Thus, extensions might consider collecting em-
pirical data on pricing policies to more accurately map
revenue to traffic volumes.
9. RELATED WORK
Social networks. The diffusion of new technologies
in social networks has been well studied in economics
and game theory (e.g., [23] and references therein). The
idea that players will myopically best-respond if their
utility exceeds some threshold is standard in this liter-
ature (cf., our update rule (3)). However, in a social
network, a player’s utility depends only on its immedi-
ate neighbors, while in our setting it depends on the set
of secure paths. Thus, while [23] finds approximation al-
gorithms for choosing an optimal set of early adopters,
this is NP-hard in our setting (Theorem 6.1).
Protocol adoption in the Internet. The idea that
competition over customer traffic can drive technology
adoption in the Internet has appeared in many places
in the literature [10, 36]. Ratnasamy et al. [36] suggest
using competition for customer traffic to drive protocol
deployment (e.g., IPv6) at ISPs by creating new mech-
anisms for directing traffic to ASes with IPv6. Leverag-
ing competition is much simpler with S*BGP, since it
directly influences routing decisions without requiring
adoption of new mechanisms.
[21, 20, 41] study the role of converters (e.g., IPv4-
IPv6 gateways) on protocol deployment. While S*BGP
must certainly be backwards compatible with BGP, the
fact that security guarantees only hold for fully-secure
paths (Section 2.2.2) means that there is no reason to
convert BGP messages to S*BGP messages. Thus, we
do not expect converters to drive S*BGP deployment.
S*BGP adoption. Perhaps most relevant is Chang et
al.’s comparative study on the adoptability of secure in-
terdomain routing protocols [8]. Like [8], we also con-
sider how early adopters create local incentives for other
ASes to deploy S*BGP. However, our study focuses on
how S*BGP deployment can be driven by (a) simplex
S*BGP deployment at stubs, and (b) the requirement
that security plays a role in routing decisions. Further-
more, in [8] ISP utility depends on the security ben-
efits offered by the partially-deployed protocol. Thus,
the utility function in [8] depends on possible attacker
strategies (i.e., path shortening attacks) and attacker
location (i.e., random, or biased towards small ISPs).
In contrast, our model of utility is based solely on eco-
nomics (i.e., customer traffic transited). Thus, we show
that global S*BGP deployment is possible even if ISPs’
local deployment decisions are not driven by security
concerns. Also, complementary to our work is [5]’s
forward-looking proposal that argues that extra mecha-
nisms (e.g., secure data-plane monitoring) can be added
to S*BGP to get around the problem of partially-secure
paths (Appendix B). Finally, we note both our work
and [5, 8] find that ensuring that Tier 1 ASes deploy
S*BGP is crucial, a fact that is not surprising in light of
the highly-skewed degree distribution of the AS graph.
10. CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that there is hope for S*BGP de-
ployment. We have argued for (1) using simplex S*BGP
to secure stubs, (2) convincing but a small, but influ-
ential, set of ASes to become early adopters of S*BGP,
and (3) ensuring the S*BGP influences traffic patterns
by requiring ASes to (at minimum) break ties between
equally-good paths based on security.
We have shown that, if deployment cost θ is low,
our proposal can successfully transition a majority of
ASes to S*BGP. The transition is driven through mar-
ket pressure created when ISPs deploy S*BGP in order
draw revenue-generating traffic into their networks. We
also pointed out unexplored challenges that result from
S*BGP’s influence of route selection (e.g., ISPs may
have incentives to disable S*BGP).
We hope that this work motivates the standardiza-
tion and research communities to devote their efforts
along three key lines. First, effort should be spent to
engineer a lightweight simplex S*BGP. Second, with se-
curity impacting route selection, ISPs will need tools
to forecast how S*BGP deployment will impact traffic
patterns (e.g., using “shadow configurations”, inspired
by [1], with cooperative neighboring ASes) so they can
provision their networks appropriately. Finally, our re-
sults suggest that S*BGP and BGP will coexist in the
long term. Thus, effort should be devoted to ensure that
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S*BGP and BGP can coexist without introducing new
vulnerabilities into the interdomain routing system.
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APPENDIX
A. A MODEL OF ROUTING WITH BGP.
We follow [16] by assuming that each AS a computes
paths to a given destination AS d based a ranking on
outgoing paths, and an export policy specifing the set of
neighbors to which a given path should be announced.
Rankings. AS a selects a path to d from the set of
simple paths he learns from his neighbors as follows:
LP Local Preference. Prefer outgoing paths where
the next hop is a customer over outgoing paths
where the next hop is a peer over paths where the
next hop is a provider.
SP Shortest Paths. Among the paths with the high-
est local preference, prefer the shortest ones.
SecP Secure Paths. If there are multiple such paths,
and node a is secure, then prefer the secure paths.
TB Tie Break. If there are multiple such paths, node
a breaks ties: if b is the next hop on the path,
choose the path where hash, H(a, b) is the lowest.2
This standard model of local preference [13] captures
the idea that an AS has incentives to prefer routing
through a customer (that pays him) over a peer (no
money is exchanged) over a provider (that he must pay).
Export Policies. This standard model of export
policies captures the idea that an AS should only be
willing to load his own network with transit traffic if
his customer pays him to do so [13]:
GR2 AS b announces a path via AS c to AS a iff at
least one of a and c are customers of b.
B. ATTACKS ON PARTIALLY SECURE PATHS
We show how preferring partially secure paths over
insecure paths can introduce new attack vectors that
do not exist even without S*BGP:
Figure 15: Suppose that only ASes p and q are
secure, and that malicious AS m falsely announces the
path (m, v), and suppose that p’s tiebreak algorithm
2In practice, this is done using the distance between routers
and router IDs. Since we do not incorporate this information
in our model we use a randomized tie break which prevents
certain ASes from “always winning”.
prefers paths through r over paths through q. Then, p
has a choice between two paths; a partially-secure false
path (p, q,m, v), and and insecure true path (p, r, s, v).
If no AS used S*BGP, p would have chosen the true
path (per his tiebreak algorithm); if p prefers partially
secure paths, he will be fooled into routing to AS m.
C. IMPLEMENTING OUR SIMULATIONS
We present implementation details for our simulations.
C.1 On the scale of our simulations.
Our model introduces a number of scaling challenges:
1. Aggregating utility for each destination. Thus,
to compute the utility function un(S) or un(¬Sn, S−n),
we need to determine Tn(d, S), the subtree of nodes
routing through ISP n in state S, for every destination
in the AS graph G(V,E) (see section 3.3). Thus, we
need to do this |V | ≈ 30K, since every AS can be a
destination.
2. Computing projected utility for each ISP.
Worse yet, notice that projected utility un(¬Sn, S−n) is
computed in a unique state (¬Sn, S−n) for each ISP n
in the AS graph. Since about 15% of ASes are ISPs, this
results in 0.15 · |V | = 4.5K unique states (¬Sn, S−n).
3. Computing the subtree Tn(d, S). Combin-
ing the above, it follows that we need to compute the
subtree Tn(d, S) about 0.15|V |2 = 135M times in each
round. To understand the scale of this computation, an
algorithm that computes Tn(d, S) in 10ms would take
375 hours to run a single round of our simulations.
To effectively run simulations at such a scale, we heav-
ily optimized the algorithms used to compute Tn(d, S),
and parallelized our simulations on a cluster of 200 ma-
chines running DryadLINQ, a recent research platform
for distributed computing developed for the .NET (C#)
framework.
C.2 The fast routing tree algorithm.
Our optimized algorithm for computing Tn(d, S) is
based on the following observation:
Observation C.1. If ASes using the routing policies
of Appendix A, the length and type ( i.e., customer, peer,
provider) of any node i’s path to a destination d is in-
dependent of the state S of the AS graph.
(Discussion is in Appendix G.) [15] has an O(3|V |+|E|)
algorithm that computes the routing tree of paths from
every source AS in the AS graph G(V,E) to a given
destination d. To further optimize this, we ran a mod-
ified version of [15]’s algorithm only once per destina-
tion d in order to obtain the following per-destination
information: the (a) length (b) type (i.e., customer,
peer, provider), and (c) tiebreak set of potential next
hops for each node i’s path to destination d. Given
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the per-destination information, we used the following
algorithm to compute Tn(d, S):
Fast routing tree algorithm: Since every node in
i’s tiebreak set has a path to d that is one-hop shorter
than node i’s path, we start at the destination d and
proceed through each node i in ascending order of path
length. For each node i in the AS graph, we determine
(a) which AS in i’s tiebreak set that i chooses as its
next hop to d, and (b) whether i has a fully-secure path
to d, by checking if (1) i is secure in state S, and (2)
there are nodes in i’s tiebreak set with a secure path to
d.
The complexity of the fast routing tree algorithm is
O(t|V |), where t is the average size of the tiebreak sets in
the AS graph. The average tiebreak set size is t = 1.18
(across all source-destination AS pairs, see also Sec-
tion 6.6), and for our graph |E| ≈ 4|V |, so our optimized
algorithm is almost 6 times faster than the O(3|V |+|E|)
algorithm of [15]. After platform-specific optimizations,
our C# implementation ran in about 2ms.
C.3 Parallelizing our simulations.
We parallelized our simulations using DryadLINQ, an
approach similar to the Map-Reduce paradigm. That is,
we parallelized (i.e., mapped) our computation of the
subtrees Tn(d, S) and Tn(d, (¬Sn, S−n)) across destina-
tions d, and then aggregated (i.e., reduced) them to
obtain utility un(S) and projected utility un(S). We
ran our code on a shared cluster of about 200 ma-
chines running DryadLINQ; by parallelizing across des-
tinations, each machine was roughly assigned computa-
tion for about |V |/200 = 150 destinations (but see [45]
for details on how exactly this implemented in DryadLINQ).
Initialization. We initialize the simulation by com-
puting the per-destination information for each desti-
nation in the AS graph. Thus, each machine runs a
modified version of the O(3|V | + |E|) algorithm from
[15] to obtain the per-destination information for each
of the |V |/200 = 150 destinations it is assigned. This
step typically ran in under five minutes.
Per-round computation. For each round of the
simulation, we start the ‘Map’ step of the computation
by shipping out the state S and about |V |/200 = 150
sets of per-destination information to each machine in
the cluster. Then, for each destination, the each ma-
chine does the following:
• The fast routing tree algorithm is run once on state
S. Then, a single pass is taken over the output
to determine Tn(d, S) for each ISP n in the AS
graph by counting the number of chosen paths that
contain n.
• For each ISP n, the fast routing tree algorithm
is run on state (¬Sn, S−n). Tn(d, (¬Sn, S−n)) is
obtained by counting the number of paths in the
output that contain n.
Thus, we require O(t|V |×0.15|V |) computation for each
of the |V | destinations.
For the ‘Reduce’ step, we aggregate Tn(d, S) (resp.,
Tn(d, (¬Sn, S−n))) for each destination to obtain the
utility un(S) (resp., projected utility un(¬Sn, S−n)) for
each ISP n. Finally, we use the utility and projected
utility to determine whether an ISP n deploys S*BGP
or not, per the update rule in (3).
C.4 Optimizing the computations.
In general, we need to run the fast routing tree algo-
rithm |V | time for each destination in each round with
state S. However, our simulations can be optimized
with the following observations:
• If a destination d is not secure in state S, then there
can never be any secure paths to that destination.
Thus, Tn(d, S) = Tn(d, (¬Sn, S−n)) for all ISPs n,
we only run the fast routing tree algorithm once for
destination d in that round.
• Theorem 6.2 shows that, in the outgoing utility
model, a node never has an incentive to turn off
S*BGP. Thus, if ISP n is secure in a round with
state S, we need not run the fast routing tree al-
gorithm on state (¬Sn, S−n) for all destinations in
all subsequent rounds.
• Consider a round with state S, where ISP n does
not have any nodes in its tiebreak set that have
secure paths to destination d. It follows that ISP n
cannot offer its neighbors any secure path in state
(¬Sn, S−n), and thus will not change their tiebreak
decisions relative to state S. Thus, we need not run
the fast routing tree algorithm for state (¬Sn, S−n)
and destination d.
These optimizations significantly reduced our compute
time. As a result of these optimization, our per-destination
computations ran in a variable amount of time, depend-
ing on the state S.
C.5 Putting it all together.
Overall, the complexity of our simulations is approx-
imately O(|V | · (3|V |+ |E|)) ≈ 6B for the initialization
step, and O(0.15 · t|V |3) ≈ 5000B per round, each of
which was reduced by a factor of 200 by parallelizing
with DryadLINQ. On an uncongested cluster, the ini-
tialization step ran in about five minutes, and one round
typically completed in about 10−35 minutes, with con-
gestion increasing running time by about 150%. Our
simulations typically arrived at a stable state after 2-
40 rounds, with simulations in where very few nodes
became secure tended to terminate more quickly (Sec-
tion C.4). Thus, we could run a simulation from start
to finish in about 1-12 hours.
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Table 2: Summary of AS graphs
Graph ASes peering customer-provider
Cyclops+IXP [9, 3] 36,964 58,829 72,848
Augmented graph 36,966 77,380 72,848
Table 3: Average path length from the five con-
tent providers to all other destinations
AS Cyclops Augmented Knodes
15169 2.7 2.1 2.2
8075 2.8 2.1 2.3
20940 3.6 2.2 2.2
22822 6.9 6.8 2.3
32934 3.5 2.1 2.4
D. AS GRAPH SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
Incompleteness of AS-level topologies. It is
widely reported that AS-level graphs of the Internet are
incomplete [34], but a ground truth for AS-level connec-
tivity remains elusive. This is especially problematic for
large content providers that primarily peer with large
numbers of ASes to drive down costs for both them-
selves and the networks they peer with. Since peering
links are only exported to customers [34] and content
providers do not generally have customers, this is po-
tentially a large blind spot in the existing data. Indeed,
we observed that average path lengths for the five CPs
in the AS graph (according to the routing policies of
Appendix A) were around 2.7-3.5 hops whereas they
are reported to be much lower, around 2.2-2.4 hops [35].
The reported value we consider is the Knodes index [35],
which uses public and private BGP data to measure the
number of hops that must be traversed between IP ad-
dresses in a given network and all other IP addresses.
Creating the augmented graph. To understand
how incompleteness of the AS-level toplogy impacts our
results, we developed an augmented topology with par-
ticular focus on more accurate connectivity for the five
CPs. Our strategy for augmenting the AS-level topol-
ogy leveraged recent research on IXPs that finds that
many CPs are joining IXPs and peering with a large
fraction of their members [3].
We used the Cyclops AS graph from Dec. 9, 2010
with additional peering edges from [3]. In the Cyclops
graph, the content providers have some customers, mainly
owing to company acquisitions (e.g., YouTube’s AS 35361
is a customer of Google). Since the CPs do not gener-
ally provide transit to other ASes, we remove these 79
customer ASes from the graph. We summarize the re-
sulting Cyclops+IXP graph in Table 2.
Starting with this graph, the five CPs were then con-
nected randomly to ASes present at IXPs [3] until their
average path length to all destinations on the Internet
decreased to around 2.1-2.2 hops. The path lengths in
the original and augmented topologies as well as the
Table 4: Degree of five CPs in original and aug-
mented graph with Tier 1s for comparison
Cyclops+IXP Cust. Peer Prov. Total
Tier 1s
174 2,928 377 12 3,317
3356 2,936 119 0 3,055
7018 2,407 135 0 2,542
701 2,069 72 0 2,141
1239 1,243 90 0 1,333
CPs
15169 0 244 3 247
8075 0 90 2 92
32934 0 49 4 53
20940 0 81 31 112
22822 0 567 10 577
Augmented Cust. Peer Prov. Total
15169 0 3,931 3 3,934
8075 0 3,927 2 3,929
32934 0 3,922 4 3,926
20940 0 3,895 31 3,926
22822 0 3,917 10 3,927
reported Knodes index [35] (an approximation of path
length) are shown in Table 3.
Properties of the augmented graph. In our aug-
mented AS graph, the five CPs have higher degree than
even the largest Tier 1s (summarized in Table 4). How-
ever, unlike the Tier 1s the five CPs edges are primarily
peering edges. The five CPs also do not provide tran-
sit. Note also that the path lengths for LimeLight (AS
22822) are longer than paths observed by other ASes.
This may be caused by the AS-level topology not be-
ing particularly complete for LimeLight or more likely,
that Limelight’s routing policies are very different from
those of Appendix A.
E. CHOOSING EARLY ADOPTERS IS HARD!
We now prove that finding the optimal set of early
adopters is NP-hard.
Theorem E.1. For an AS graph G(V,E) and a pa-
rameter 1 ≤ k ≤ |V |, finding a set of early adopter ASes
of size k that maximizes the number of ASes that are
secure when the deployment process terminates is NP-
hard, both in the incoming and outgoing utility model.
Approximating the solution within a constant factor is
NP-hard as well.
Proof. We prove the theorem via reduction from
the NP-complete SET-COVER. In SET-COVER we are
given m subsets of a universe U , S1, . . . , Sm, and an
integer k. The objective is to find a collection of k of
the subsets that covers the most elements in U .
Given an instance of SET-COVER, our reduction to
the problem of finding a set of early adopters is as fol-
lows. We create a network with a single destination
node d, 2 nodes, si1 and si2, for each Si, and a node
u for every element in U (plus some additional nodes,
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as we now explain). Our construction is described in
Figure 16.
d is a stub customer of all si1’s, and each si1 is a
customer of si2. Each si2 is a provider of every stub
u that corresponds to an element in the universe U (in
SET-COVER) that belongs to Si. Observe that each
node u has a 4-hop provider route to d through every
node si2 such that u ∈ Si. We shall assume that each
node u has another 4-hop provider route that does not
go through any of the aforementioned nodes, and that
this route is preferable to all other routes. We also
assume that all of these additional routes are disjoint.
For simplicity, we do not include these routes in the
figure.
We restrict our attention to the case that there ex-
ist a collection C of k sets in S1, . . . , Sm (in the SET-
COVER instance) that together cover all elements in U .
(The proofs establishing the NP-completeness of SET-
COVER actually show that even when guaranteed that
k such sets exist finding them is NP-hard.) We ob-
serve that in this case, the optimal choice of early set of
adopters of size k (in both the incoming and outgoing
utility models) is to select each si1 such that Si ∈ C to
be an early adopter. Observe that following this choice
of early adopters, at the first time step all their si2
providers will deploy S*BGP and consequently all the
u nodes will upgrade to S*BGP. Observe also that ev-
ery other choice of k nodes to secure leads to worse end
results.
Hence, an optimal set of early adopters implies an
optimal solution to SET-COVER. SET-COVER is not
only NP-hard to solve exactly but also NP-hard to ap-
proximate within any constant factor. That is, even
finding a collection of sets of size αk, where α is a con-
stant, that covers all elements in U is NP hard. We
make the following important observation. Our reduc-
tion is such that a constant approximation solution to
our problem guarantees a constant approximation to
SET-COVER. To see this, observe that every choice
of αk si1’s leads the corresponding αk si2’s and their
customers (that correspond to the covered elements in
SET-COVER) to deploy in the next time step. Thus,
eventually, the number of nodes to deploy is 2αk plus
the number of covered elements in U . Hence, a constant
factor approximation for our problem implies a constant
factor approximation to SET-COVER. The theorem fol-
lows.
F. OSCILLATIONS EXIST
We prove that oscillations exist in the incoming util-
ity model. Our proof is an scenario we call the Oscil-
lator; a group of nodes that alternates between turn-






Figure 16: Proof of Theorem E.1.







































Oscillator Phase 3 – now 1 undeploys (to gain traffic from s3 but lose traffic from s1)
Figure 17: Phases of the Oscillator.
state:3
Figure 17 There are three source of traffic s1, s2,
s3, trees of nodes connected by customer-provider edges
(so that all nodes in the customer tree are transitive
customers of the root). There are two stub destinations
d1 and d2. For simplicity, assume that s1 and s3 send
traffic to d1 via the nodes shown, and that they have
some better path to d2 (not shown). Similarly suppose
s2 sends traffic to d2 via the nodes shown. Suppose
that s3 contains many more nodes than s1, and that
each of s1, s2, s3 has a tiebreak algorithm that prefers
paths through nodes with the lowest AS number. We’ll
also assume that nodes 11, 21 are stuck in an insecure
state, while nodes 24 is stuck in a secure state, and show
an oscillation involving nodes 1 and 2:
3This example was not taken from our simulations.
19
Phase 1: Initially, both 1 and 2 are insecure. Here,
ISP 1’s incoming utility increases from (customer) traf-
fic originating at s3 and node 2 obtains incoming utility
from customer traffic originating at s2.
Phase 2: Node 1 now becomes secure in order to
attract customer traffic from s1. Note that node 2 has
now lost incoming utility, because node 1 has stolen
away the customer traffic from s3.
Phase 3: Node 2 now becomes secure in order in
order to get back the traffic from s3. In doing this,
node 2 loses incoming utility from nodes in s2 (since
their traffic now enters s3 along a peer edge) but since
s3 has more nodes than s2, node 2 is still better off.
Notice that node 1 has now lost the customer traffic
from s3.
Phase 4: Now, node 1 turns on S*BGP in order
to get back the customer traffic from s3; (by becoming
insecure, s3 choosing paths according to his tiebreak
algorithm, that comes up in favor of node 11, cf., Fig-
ure 13). Notice that node 2 has lost the customer traffic
from s3; furthermore, traffic from s2 has no impact on
his utility, because he receives it via a peering edge.
Phase 5: Finally, node 2 increases his incoming
utility by turning off S*BGP (again cf., Figure 13). This
follows because he convinces s2 to route to him along a
customer edge (rather than a peer edge, as in Phase 3),
and we are back in Phase 1!
G. A NOTE ON BGP CONVERGENCE
In this section, we make a number of observations
about route selection when ASes use the routing policies
of Appendix A. Namely, we show that when ASes use
these routing policies, (1) it follows that BGP converges
to a stable state (i.e., no AS will want to change its
path selection in order to obtain a path that is more
preferred according to its ranking function [16]), and
(2) we discuss Observation C.1, that was the basis of
our optimized simulation algorithms.
Preliminaries. Since BGP sets up routes to each des-
tination independently, we focus on routing to a unique
destination d. We say that a route (v0, v1, . . . , d) is ex-
portable if for every i ≥ 0 it holds that vi+1 announcing
the route (vi+1, . . . , d) to vi does not violate GR2. We
say that a route (v0, v1, . . . , d) is a customer route if v1
is a customer of v0. We define peer routes and provider
routes analogously.
Discussion for Observation C.1. Given a deploy-
ment state S (i.e., the set of secure nodes), for every
node i we define the BEST − ROUTES(i, S, d) to be
the set of all exportable routes from i to d that are pre-
ferred by i over all other exportable routes. Observe
that all routes in BEST − ROUTES(i, S, d) must be-
long to the same type—customer routes, peer routes,
or provider routes—and either all be (entirely) secure
or all be unsecure. Moreover, all routes in BEST −
ROUTES(i, S, d) must be of the same length. We de-
fine NEXT (i, S, d) to be the set that contains every
node j such that j is i’s next-hop node on some route
in BEST − ROUTES(i, S, d). The following lemma
shows that we can capture the routing decisions of ev-
ery AS i in the graph by maintaining information about
(a) NEXT (i, S, d), (b) length of paths in BEST −
ROUTES(i, S, d), and (c) type of path in BEST −
ROUTES(i, S, d). Furthermore, it argues that BGP
converges to a stable state:
Lemma G.1. In our routing model, BGP is guaran-
teed to converge to a stable state where each node i’s
next-hop is the node in NEXT (i, S, d) that i breaks ties
in favor of.
Proof. The lemma follows from the three following
propositions:
Proposition G.2. In our routing model BGP is guar-
anteed to converge to a stable state where for each node
i whose BEST−ROUTES(i, S, d) consists of customer
routes it holds that i’s next-hop is in NEXT (i, S, d).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the path length.
Consider the case that BEST −ROUTES(i, S, d) con-
sists of a customer route of length 1. Clearly, in this
case i will select the direct route to d (that is its most
preferred route), and so its next-hop will indeed triv-
ially be as in the statement of the theorem. Next, con-
sider the case that BEST −ROUTES(i, S, d) consists
of customer routes of length 2. Observe that in this
case each node in NEXT (i, S, d) has a customer route
of length 1 and thus will, for some moment onwards,
converge to that route (as we have established). Thus,
from some point in time forth i shall have all routes
in BEST − ROUTES(i, S, d) available to it and shall
hence have a node in NEXT (i, S, d) as a next-hop, and
specifically the node that i breaks ties in favor of. And
so on.
Similar proofs establish the following.
Proposition G.3. In our routing model BGP is guar-
anteed to converge to a stable state where for each node i
whose BEST−ROUTES(i, S, d) consists of peer routes
it holds that i’s next-hop is in NEXT (i, S, d).
To see why Proposition G.3 holds, observe that if
a node i has an exportable peer route in BEST −
ROUTES(i, S, d), then the next-hop on that route has
an exportable customer route in its BEST −ROUTES
set. Therefore, by Proposition G.2, the next-hop node’s
route will, from some moment in time forth, stabilize.
From that moment onwards node i will have have a
route in BEST −ROUTES(i, S, d) available to it.
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Proposition G.4. In our routing model BGP is guar-
anteed to converge to a stable state where for each node
i whose BEST −ROUTES(i, S, d) consists of provider
routes it holds that i’s next-hop is in NEXT (i, S, d).
The proof of Proposition G.4 is similar to that of the
previous propositions. Propositions G.2 and G.3 es-
tablish that the route of every node i whose BEST −
ROUTES(i, S, d) set only consists of customer of peer
routes will eventually stabilize. We can now use induc-
tion (as in the proof of Proposition G.2) to show that
the routes nodes whose BEST −ROUTES sets consist
of provider routes will also eventually stabilize). The
induction now is on the number of customer-provider
edges on the route.
H. ISPS NEVER TURN OFF S*BGP IN THE
OUTGOING UTILITY MODEL
Theorem H.1. In the outgoing utility model, a se-
cure node will never have an incentive to turn OFF
S*BGP.
Proof. Consider a deployment state S where a node
i is OFF and the deployment state S that is identical to
state S with the exception that node i is ON in S. We
now prove that i’s outgoing utility in S (that is, its util-
ity from the routing state BGP converges to when the
deployment state is S cannot possibly be less than its
outgoing utility in S. Because we establish that this is
true for every node i and every two such states S and S,
it follows that a node can never gain from deactivating
S*BGP.
The above follows from Lemma G.1. To see this, con-
sider a single destination d. We have shown that when
the deployment state is S, BGP is guaranteed to con-
verge to a stable state where each node i’s next-hop is
the node in NEXT (i, S, d) that i breaks ties in favor
of (see Appendix G). Recall that it must hold, for each
node i, that either all routes inBEST−ROUTES(i, S, d)
are secure or all routes in BEST−ROUTES(i, S, d) are
insecure.
Now, consider two states S and S as above, that differ
only in that a node i becomes secure in S. Consider a
node j 6= i in the network. We handle three cases:
1. Case I: Both BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d) and
BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d) consist only of in-
secure routes. That is, the fact that i turned ON
in S did not create new “best routes” for node j.
Therefore, BEST −ROUTES(j, S, d) = BEST −
ROUTES(j, S, d). Lemma G.1 implies that in both
S and S j will select the same next-hop en route
to d.
2. Case II: BEST−ROUTES(j, S, d) consists only








Figure 18: The DILEMMA network: x cannot
attract both c1 and c2’s traffic simultaneously
along customer edges.
consists only of secure routes. Observe that in
this case all routes in BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d)
must traverse i (as previously j had no secure routes).
3. Case III: Both BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d) and
BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d) consist only of se-
cure routes. Observe that in this case BEST −
ROUTES(j, S, d) ⊆ BEST − ROUTES(j, S, d)
(i’s transition to S*BGP could not have made a
secure route insecure, only add to the set of secure
routes).
Observe that the above three cases imply that if i did
not create new secure “best routes” for another node j
then j’s choice of next-hop en route to d remains the
same. Otherwise, j might choose a next-hop that goes
through i. Thus, i can never lose traffic from transi-
tioning to S*BGP. This holds for every destination d.
The theorem follows.
I. FINDING THE OPTIMAL ROUTING POL-
ICY IS HARD
We now show that it is NP-hard for a node to find
a routing policy (ranking function and export policy)
that is optimal with respect to traffic attraction. [15]
shows that this statement is correct in the outgoing
utility model. (Specifically, Theorem F.7 and Theorem
F.8 work if the so called “manipulator” is a customer of
the destination node. This implies that when all other
ASes’ routing policies are as in Appendix A, it is NP
hard for any AS n to find the routing policy that max-
imizes its outgoing utility.) We now extend the result
in [15] to the incoming utility model.
Theorem I.1. When all other ASes’ routing policies
are as in Appendix A, it is NP hard for any AS n to
find the routing policy that maximizes its incoming util-
ity. Moreover, approximating the optimal routing policy
within any constant factor is also NP hard.
Proof. Our proof follows the proof in [15], that shows
that attracting traffic is NP-hard when the node has
no economic considerations, but merely wants as much
traffic as possible to flow through it. [15] shows that
it is even hard to approximate the optimum within
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any constant factor. We show that this hardness re-
sult continues to hold in our context. The key ingre-
dient in the proof in [15] is showing the existence of
a construction called the DILEMMA network. This
construction is then used in a reduction from the NP-
hard INDEPENDENT-SET problem. To prove our NP-
hardness results we show that a DILEMMA network
can be constructed for our context as well. The rest of
our proof then proceeds as in [15]. The reader is referred
to [15] for an overview of the complete proof argument.
In the DILEMMA network, there exist a node x that
wishes to attract the traffic of two other nodes in the
network, c1 and c2. However, while x can attract the
traffic of c1 alone, or of c2 alone, it is unable to attract
the traffic of both nodes simultaneously. We now show
how a network can be constructed in our context.
Consider the network in Figure 18. Observe that
node x is directly connected to the (single) destination
d, and so its ranking function is trivial. Thus, node
x’s choice of routing policy boils down to the choice of
export policy (i.e., which nodes to announce the route
(x, d) to). Observe also that x must clearly announce
(x, d) to its customers (for otherwise it will definitely fail
in attracting traffic from c1 or c2). Hence, the only de-
cision that x must make is whether or not to announce
(x, d) to node 1.
We assume that nodes’ tie-breaking rules are such
that they never break ties in favor of routes that have x
as a next hop. We make the following observations. If x
does not announce the route (x, d) to node 1, then x will
attract c2’s traffic along a customer edge (as c2 will have
no other route to d), but will lose c1’s traffic (as 3 will
then route directly to d and so c1 shall route through 3).
If, on the other hand, x does announce the route (x, d)
to 1 then x attracts c1’s traffic along a customer edge
(as 3 will then select the long customer route through
x), but c2’s traffic shall then reach x along the edge
(1, x) (a provider edge).
The proof now follows from the arguments in [15].
J. PER-LINK DEPLOYMENT IS HARD
We consider the case that a node can deploy S*BGP
on a per-link basis. That is, instead of just turning
itself ON or OFF, the node can decide to sign/verify
routes for a specific neighbor, yet not to do so for an-
other neighbor. We note, that we focus on the case
that deployment entails both signing and verification,
and ignore the scenario that a node might decide only
to verify signed routes from a neighbor, but not to sign
to routes for that neighbor.
We show that in the incoming utility model, choosing
which links to deploy S-BGP on is NP-hard.
Theorem J.1. Given an AS graph and state S, it is
NP-hard to choose the set of neighbors for which ISP








Figure 19: The DILEMMA network: x cannot
attract both c1 and c2’s traffic simultaneously
along customer edges.
utility. Moreover, approximating the optimum within
any constant factor is also NP hard.
Proof. Our proof, similarly to the proof of Theo-
rem I.1, follows the proof in [15]. Thus, the key is show-
ing the existence of a DILEMMA network construction,
where a node x can attract the traffic of node c1 alone
(along a customer edge), or of a node c2 alone (along
a customer edge), but is unable to attract the traffic of
both nodes simultaneously.
We present such a DILEMMA network construction
in Figure 18. Nodes c1 and c2 wish to sent traffic to
destination nodes d1 and d2, respectively. We assume
that nodes’ tie-breaking rules are such that they never
break ties in favor of routes that have x as a next hop.
Observe that if node x secures the link to node 2 then
it gains c2’s traffic (to which it can now offer a secure
route to d2), yet loses c1’s traffic (as c2 would prefer the
secure route to d1 through 2). However, if node x does
not secure the link to node 2, then it gains c1’s traf-
fic (because of tie-breaking), but loses c2’s traffic (also
because of tie-breaking). Thus, x can indeed attract
traffic (along a customer edge) of either c1 or c2, but
cannot attract both nodes’ traffic simultaneously.
The proof now follows from the arguments in [15].
We prove that in the outgoing utility model finding
the utility maximizing per-link deployment can be done
in a computationally-efficient manner.
Theorem J.2. Given an AS graph and state S, de-
ploying S*BGP for all neighbors maximizes the outgoing
utility for every node in the network.
The proof of theorem J.2 uses the exact same argu-
ments as in the proof of Theorem H.1. (Only now we
apply these arguments on a per-link basis.)
K. DETECTING OSCILLATIONS IS HARD!
The complexity class PSPACE consists of all deci-
sions problems that can be solved using only polynomial
space (no limit is set on the amount of time it takes to
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compute the solution). Intuitively, PSPACE-complete
problems can be viewed as the hardest problems that
lie within PSPACE. These problems are at least as hard
as the notoriously NP-complete SAT, TRAVELING-
SALESMAN, and CLIQUE problems, and are widely
believed to be even harder. Hence, if a decision prob-
lem is PSPACE-complete then it is impossible to solve
in a computationally-efficient manner unless the most
fundamental premises of contemporary complexity the-
ory (including P6=NP) collapse.
We present the following computational problem, that
we call “S*BGP ADOPTION”. In S*BGP ADOPTION,
the input is a network with n nodes (as described in Sec-
tion 3), and a string S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ {0, 1}n. The
goal in S*BGP ADOPTION is to determine whether,
when starting at a state in which each node i is using
S-BGP iff Si = 1, the deployment of S-BGP can enter
indefinite oscillations. S*BGP ADOPTION can easily
be shown to be in PSPACE. This is because with poly-
nomial space it is possible to simply go over all possi-
ble starting states and check, for each one, whether the
deployment dynamics converge to a stable state. We
prove that S*BGP ADOPTION is, in fact, PSPACE-
complete, thus establishing the intractability of predict-
ing the network evolution from a given state.
Theorem K.1. Given an AS graph and state S, it is
PSPACE-complete to decide if the deployment process
will terminate at a stable state in the incoming utility
model.
In the remainder of this section we prove Theorem K.1,
that is, establish that S*BGP ADOPTION is PSPACE-
complete in the incoming utility model.
K.1 Definition of STATIC-MODE.
We present a reduction to S*BGP ADOPTION from
the following problem, that we term “STATIC-MODE”
and show is PSPACE-complete. In STATIC-MODE the
input is a space-bounded Turing machine and the goal
is to determine, for a given string that is fed into the
Turing machine, whether the Turing machine eventually
enters a fixed configuration. We now present STATIC-
MODE in detail.
Input:
• a specification of a space-bounded Turing machine
M in the form of an 8-tuple (Q,Γ, b,Σ, q0, F, r, δ),
where
– Q is a finite, non-empty set of machine-states.
|Q| = q.
– Γ is a finite, non-empty set of the tape alpha-
bet/symbols. |Γ| = γ.
– b ∈ Γ is the unique blank symbol.
– Σ ⊆ Γ is the set of input symbols.
– q0 is the initial machine-state.
– F ⊆ Q is the set of final machine-states.
– r > 0 is an integer bound on the length of M ’s
tape.
– δ : {1, . . . , r} × Q × Γ → {1, . . . , r} × Q × Γ
is the transition function. δ specifies how M
moves from one configuration of M—a location
of M ’s head h ∈ {1, . . . , r}, a state s ∈ Q and a
string of symbols g ∈ Γr that specifies the cells’
contents—to another. We restrict δ so that if
δ(h, s, g) = (h′, s′, g′), then h′ ∈ {h−1, h, h+1}
(that is, the head can move at most one cell at
each time).
• a string x ∈ Σr that is M ’s input string (the input
to be fed into M).
Goal: We call a configuration c = (h, s, g) of the Turing
machine M static if δ(c) = c. The objective in STATIC-
MODE is to determine whether M ’s execution for the
input string x reaches a static configuration.
STATIC-MODE is closely related to the problem of
determining whether a space-bounded Turing machine
M (as above) will halt for a given input string, that
is known to be PSPACE-complete (see, e.g., [12, 31]).
Indeed, a simple reduction from the latter (essentially
guaranteeing via easy tweaks that M enter a static
mode instead of halting) establishes that STATIC-MODE
too is PSPACE-complete.
Proposition K.2. STATIC-MODE is PSPACE-complete.
K.2 High-level overview.
We now give a high-level overview of our proof that
S*BGP ADOPTION is PSPACE-complete. We present
a polynomial-time reduction from STATIC-MODE to
S*BGP ADOPTION, thus establishing that the latter
is also PSPACE-complete. We first translate the in-
put to STATIC-MODE to an input in S*BGP ADOP-
TION. We then show that the deployments dynamics
in S*BGP ADOPTION simulate the execution of the
Turing machine M in STATIC-MODE and prove that
convergence to a stable state in S*BGP ADOPTION is
achieved iff M enters a static configuration in STATIC-
MODE.
Given an input to STATIC-MODE, we construct a
network in S*BGP ADOPTION. We now present some
key elements in our construction. We discuss the de-
tails in Section K.10. We create the following sets of
nodes (we also create additional nodes that are added
to guarantee traits discussed below):
• k head nodes, h1, . . . hr, where each node hi rep-
resents a possible location of Turing machine M ’s
head.
• q machine-state nodes, {sβ}β∈Q, where each node
sβ represents the state β ∈ Q of STATIC-MODE.
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• k cell clusters, C1, . . . , Cr, where each cell cluster
Ci consists of γ symbol nodes {gi,σ}σ∈Γ, each rep-
resenting a possible symbol in cell i.
We call a state of the network in S*BGP ADOPTION
“clean” if only a single head node h is using S-BGP (is
ON), only a single machine-state node s is ON, only a
single node gi in every cell-cluster Ci is ON. Observe
that every clean state in S*BGP ADOPTION captures
a configuration of the Turing machine M is STATIC-
MODE (in which the index of the single head node using
S-BGP is the location of M ’s head, and so on).
We set the initial state of the network in S*BGP
ADOPTION to be the clean state in which the single
head node ON is h1; the single state node ON is the
node that represents q0; in each cell cluster Ci, the sin-
gle symbol node ON is gi,xi . Observe that this clean
state in S*BGP ADOPTION captures the initial con-
figuration of M (the head is pointing to the first cell,
that contains x1, and the machine-state is the initial
machine-state q0).
We prove that, from a clean state α in S*BGP ADOP-
TION that represents a configuration c = (h, s, g) in
STATIC-MODE, the network evolves (within a con-
stant number of time steps) to another clean state that
represents the configuration that immediately follows c
in STATIC-MODE (after applying δ). Thus, we show
that when starting at an initial state of the network
as described above, the network evolution essentially
mimics the execution of M for the input string x. In
addition, we prove that if M enters a static mode when
executed on x, then the network will converge to a sta-
ble state in S*BGP ADOPTION, and vice versa. This
reduction hence establishes that S*BGP ADOPTION
is indeed PSPACE-complete.
K.3 The AND and CHICKEN gadgets
We now present two gadgets that play a crucial role in
the proof: the And Gadget and the Chicken Gad-
get . We first make the following general remarks
about our constructions below.
Fixed nodes. In all of our gadgets there are some
nodes that can sometimes be ON and sometimes be
OFF, and some nodes, that we call “fixed nodes”, whose
status is fixed, i.e., they are either ON all the time
or OFF all the time. There are many simple gadgets
that we could construct to ensure that a particular node
remains stuck in a certain state regardless of the state
of the other nodes in the network. To reduce clutter we
omit these.
Routing policies. Nodes’ routing policies in all our
constructions are as in Appendix A.
Tie-breaking. In our constructions below we shall as-
sume that nodes break ties between equally good routes
in favor of the route with the next hop that has the low-
est AS number.
Traffic flows. To create the flows of traffic in our
gadgets, we specify a source of traffic, and a destination
of traffic. Traffic sources are trees of nodes connected
by customer-provider edges (so that all nodes in the
customer tree are transitive customers of the root). We
represent such trees as pyramids in our figures, and in-
dicate the number of nodes in a customer tree with a
label, e.g., Cross 1 in Figure 21 has size m. Similarly,
we depict traffic destinations as pyramids. To create
a traffic flow of a particular magnitude in our gadgets,
a customer tree will send traffic to destination, e.g., in
Figure 21 customer tree Cross 1 sends traffic to desti-
nation d2, creating a traffic flow of size m. The nodes
in the gadgets will then (potentially) obtain utility by
attracting this traffic flow.
Getting rid of non-designated traffic. Our gad-
gets will rely on the fact that only designated traffic
flows affect the decisions made by nodes in the gadget.
We will always state (in the text) exactly which flows
are designated, e.g., Cross 1 sending traffic to d2 in
Figure 21. However, we also need a way to ensure that
non-designated traffic does not flow into the gadget and
affect the decisions made by the nodes. In the two sim-
ple two gadgets below, this can easily be achieved. We
later discuss how this is done for more complex con-
structions.
K.4 The AND Gadget.
We present the And Gadget , shown in Figure 20.
In this gadget there are three “input-nodes”, 1, 2, 3, and
a single “output node” &. The And Gadget is such
that node & turns ON iff nodes 1, 2, 3 turn on (and
thus, node & can be regarded as the AND operator for
inputs 1, 2, 3). To achieve this we create additional fixed
nodes: four nodes 101, 102, 5, 6, the destination d and
customer trees And i for i = 1, 2, 3 and Hold. All fixed
nodes are constantly ON, with the exception of node 5,
that is OFF.
Proposition K.3. Node & turns ON iff nodes 1, 2, 3
turn ON.
Proof. We make the following observations.
• And traffic. For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the And i
customer tree has two available routes to d: a se-
cure route (And i, 101, 102, d) and the route (And
i, i,&, d). Observe that the latter route is chosen
iff both i and & are ON (since the customer tree
prefers secure routes over insecure routes, and i has
a lower AS number than 101.) Observe also that
if the latter route is used by customer tree And i
then & obtains 2m-units of utility.
• Hold traffic. Customer tree Hold also has two
available routes to d, route (Hold, 5,&, d) and route
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(a) & is OFF, it prefers 5m-units of utility














(b) & is ON, it prefers 6m-units of utility
from And traffic
Figure 20: States of the And Gadget .
(Hold, 6,&, d). Observe that the latter route is
chosen iff both i and & are ON (since if & is on,
the hold traffic has a secure route to d). Observe
also that if the former route is chosen, &’s utility is
5m (since it receives the traffic from a customer),
while if the latter router is chosen, & obtains no
utility (since it receives the traffic from a peer).
Hence, & will turn ON iff & can obtain more than
5m-units of utility (which is what & receives when it is
OFF, from the Hold traffic). This occurs iff 1, 2 and 3
are all turned ON so that & attracts 2m+2m+2m = 6m
units of And traffic.
K.5 The CHICKEN Gadget.
We present the Chicken Gadget , shown in Fig-
ure 21. Chicken Gadget emulates the famous two-
player game of chicken. In this gadget, there are two
nodes, 10 and 20, and some additional fixed nodes.
Chicken Gadget is such that (1) whenever both 10
and 20 are ON, or both 10 and 20 are OFF, both nodes
nodes want to change to the other action; and (2) if
one node in {10, 20} is ON, but the other is OFF, then
both nodes are content with their actions (and hence
the state of the network is stable).
Consider the Chicken Gadget construction, shown
in Figure 21. Observe that the Chicken Gadget
is asymmetrical, as node 20 is a provider of node 10.
Chicken Gadget also consists of the fixed nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
destinations d1, d2, and four customer trees. Customer
tree Local 1 wants to reach destination d1, customer
tree Local 2 wants to reach destination d2, customer
tree Cross 1 wants to reach destination d2, and cus-
tomer tree Cross2 wants to reach destination d1. The
fixed Nodes 1, 2, 4 and 5 are always OFF, and nodes
3, 6, 1000, 20 and all of the destinations and customer
trees are always ON. We choose ε and m so that ε m.
Lemma K.4. Chicken Gadget is such that
1. if both 10 and 20 are ON then both nodes wish to
be turned OFF;
2. if both 10 and 20 are OFF then both nodes wish to
be turned ON;
3. if 10 is ON and 20 is OFF, then both nodes do not
wish to select another action;
4. if 10 is OFF and 20 is ON, then both nodes do not
wish to select another action.
Proof. Figure 21 depicts all four states of the Chicken
Gadget . We make the following observations.
• Local Traffic. Traffic from Local 1 has two avail-
able routes to d1: a secure provider route (Lo-
cal 1, 1000, d1) and an equal-length provider route
through node 10 (Local 1,10, d1). Observe that
the former route is chosen if 10 is OFF, since in
this case, it is the only secure route, (e.g., Fig-
ure 21(b), 21(d)). Observe also that the latter route
is chosen if node 10 turns ON, since in this case
both available routes are secure, and 10 has lower
AS number than 1000 (e.g., Figure 21(a), 21(c)).
Node 10’s utility increases by a small amount, ε-
units, if the latter route is chosen. The same state-
ment is true for Local 2 and node 20.
• Cross 1 Traffic. Consider the m-units of traffic
from Cross 1 to d2. To understand what routes are
available to Cross 1, we first need to look at the
route 10 chooses to get d2; namely, observe that
10 chooses a longer peer route (10, 6, 20, d2) over
the shorter provider route (10, 20, d2) (see e.g., Fig-
ure 21(a)). Now we can see that Cross 1 has two
equidistant provider routes to d2, route (Cross 1,
10, 6, 20, d2), and insecure route (Cross 1, 1, 4, 20, d2).
We have two cases:
– If both nodes 10 and 20 are turned ON, the
former route becomes secure, and is chosen by
Cross 2 (Figure 21(a)). In this case, the utility
of node 10 increases by m-units, as it receives
traffic from the directly connected Cross 1 cus-
tomer tree. Meanwhile, the utility of node 20 is
unchanged, because 20 receives this traffic from
its provider node 6.
– If at least one of nodes 10 and 20 are turned
OFF, then the former route is insecure; thus,
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(d) (OFF,ON) Desirable cross traffic
Figure 21: States of the Chicken Gadget.
number, and choose the former route through
node 1 (e.g., Figure 21(b), 21(c), or 21(d)). In
this case, node 10 receives no utility (because it
is not on the route the traffic takes), while node
20 receives m-units of utility, as it receives this
traffic from its customer 4.
• Cross 2 Traffic. Consider the 2m-units of traffic
from Cross 2 to d1. This time, we start by looking
at the routes available from 20 to d1; namely, ob-
serve that 20 chooses the customer route (20, 10, d1)
over the provider route (20, 6, 10, d1) (see e.g., Fig-
ure 21(a)). Now, Cross 2 has two equidistant provider
routes to d2, route (Cross 2, 3, 20, 10, d1), and in-
secure route (Cross 2, 2, 4, 10, d1). We again have
two cases:
– If both routes 10 and 20 are turned ON, the
former route becomes secure, and is chosen by
Cross 2 (Figure 21(a)). In this case, the utility
of node 10 is unaffected (because it receives this
traffic from its provider 20). The utility of node
20 is also unchanged (as it receives its peer 3).
– If at least one of nodes 10 and 20 are turned
OFF, then the former route is insecure; thus,
Cross 2 will make its route choice based on AS
number, and choose the former route through
node 2 (e.g., Figure 21(b), 21(c), or 21(d)). In
this case, route 10 receives 2m-units of utility
(because it receives the traffic from its customer
5), while node 20 receives no utility (as it is not
on the route taken by this traffic).
ε  m and so nodes 10 and 20 value Cross traffic
significantly more than Local traffic. From the discus-
sion above it is clear that when both 10 and 20 are
turned ON, the Cross traffic provides them with utility
(m, 0) (i.e., 10 has utility m, 20 has utility 0). When
at least one of these nodes is OFF, the Cross traffic
provides them with utility (2m,m). Clearly, the latter
case is more desirable, and so we refer to this as desir-
able Cross traffic. The former case is called undesirable
cross traffic.
Based Figure 21, and the discussion above, we can
construct a bi-matrix for the nodes 10 and 20 in Chicken
Gadget . The bi-matrix is shown in Figure 5. From
the bi-matrix, it is clear that the Chicken Gadget has
two stable states, where 10 and 20’s actions are (ON,
OFF) and (OFF, ON), and that it emulates (an asym-
metric version of) the classic chicken game. Notice also
that when the nodes are attracting desirable Cross traf-
fic (i.e., least one of them is turned OFF), each node
obtains at least m − ε-units more utility than when it
attracts undesirable cross traffic (i.e., both of them are
ON).
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10 ON 10 OFF
20 ON m+ ε, ε 2m,m+ ε
20 OFF 2m+ ε,m 2m,m
Table 5: Chicken Gadget matrix. Assume m ε.
p













Cross( j, i )Cross( i, j )
Per player
Per pair of players
d(ℓ)
m 2m
Chicken Gadget – take 3 Connecting the Gadgets togetherFigure 22: Chicken Gad et between nodes i < j
of Selector Gadget
K.6 The k-SELECTOR Gadget.
The Selector Gadget , shown in Figure 22, is a
generalization of the Chicken Gadget . In the k-
Selector Gadget there are k nodes 1, . . . , k and,
for each node i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there is an additional
node 10i, a destination d(i) and a customer tree Lo-
cal(i) (as shown with solid lines in Figure 22). ∀i, j ∈
{1, . . . , k} such that i < j, k-Selector Gadget con-
tains a Chicken Gadget that includes the nodes pij , xij , yij , vij , wij , zij
and customer trees Cross(i,j) and Cross(j,i) (as shown
with dotted lines in Figure 22).
Intuitively, k-Selector Gadget generalizes Chicken
Gadget in that all nodes are incentivized to be at a
state in which exactly a single node in 1, . . . , k in ON
and all other nodes in 1, . . . , k are OFF.
Lemma K.5. k-Selector Gadget is such that
1. there are k stable states, each where one of the
nodes in {1, . . . , k} is ON and all other nodes in
{1, . . . , k} are OFF.
2. in states in which more than one node in {1, . . . , k}
in ON, all nodes wish to turn OFF.
Proof. To construct the Selector Gadget , we
use a clique of Chicken Gadget . Figure 22 shows the
Chicken Gadget that is used as building block in the
Selector Gadget . It is easy to see that this gadget
works identically to that of Figure 21, if we ensure that:
• Node xij has lower AS number than node yij .
• Node wij has lower AS number than node i.
Before proving the correctness of the lemma, we dis-
cuss how to handle non-designated traffic. We want to
ensure that traffic from one Chicken Gadget does not
flow into another Chicken Gadget , e.g., that traffic
from Cross(i,j) to some destination d`, ` 6= j, k, does not
flow through the gadgets. We have a simple fix; simply
connect the offending pair (e.g., Cross(i,j) to d`) with a
peer-to-peer edge. Clearly, doing this cannot introduce
new customer provider loops into the network; further-
more, this peer route will be preferred by the pair over
the provider route through the nodes in the gadget. Fi-
nally, this ensure that customer trees and destination
nodes may only have peers and providers; as such they
cannot be used to transit other traffic (i.e., one of the
offending pair, e.g., d`, cannot carry traffic from some
node or customer tree a to some other node or customer
tree b) and potentially create problems for our gadgets.4
We say the the Selector Gadget is set to state
` ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if only node ` is turned ON, and all other
nodes in {1, . . . , k} are turned OFF. The basic idea of
the proof is that each node wants to retain desirable
cross traffic at all costs; thus, if more than one node
turns ON, pairs of these ON nodes will be connected by
a Chicken Gadget in which they lose the desirable
cross traffic, and thus want to turn OFF. We now ar-
gue that each state ` is stable, and all other states are
unstable. We handle three cases:
• All nodes are OFF. Here, every Chicken Gad-
get is in the (OFF, OFF) state, so that every
node in {1, . . . , k} receives desirable cross traffic
from each Chicken Gadget . That is, each node
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} gets 2m-units of cross traffic from
each of the (j − 1) Chicken Gadget with nodes
i < j, and m-units of cross traffic from each of the
(k− j) Chicken Gadget with nodes j < i. Thus,
each node j has utility m(k− 1) +m(j − 1). How-
ever, this state is unstable; if a node in {1, . . . , k}
turns ON unilaterally, it increase its utility by ε-
units by attracting local traffic while still retaining
desirable cross traffic.
• Only node ` is ON. In this case, there is at least
one OFF node in each Chicken Gadget , so all
nodes in {1, . . . , k} receive desirable cross traffic.
The utility of all nodes in {1, . . . , k} except ` re-
mains as in the ‘All nodes OFF’ state, except node
4We observe that our construction does not introduce any
customer-provider loops (thus does not violate the Gao-
Rexford conditions [13]). Since the Chicken Gadget is
inherently asymmetrical, we need to show that the connect-
ing Chicken Gadget between every pair nodes (i, j) does
not create customer provider loops that violate GR1. First,
each individual Chicken Gadget has no customer-provider
loops. Thus, it remains to consider only customer-provider
loops involving interconnections between nodes i, j, pij in
different chicken gadgets. Since each pij only has two edges,
one of which is a peer-peer edge, it cannot be involved in
any customer-provider loops. This, we need only concern
ourselves with the customer-provider edges between i and j.
However, observe that for every two nodes i < j that appear
in a Chicken Gadget , node i is always a customer of node
j. Thus, the existence of a customer-provider loop implies
that there must be some nodes i 6= j such that both i > j
and i < j (—a contradiction!).
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` that obtains additional local traffic, slightly in-
creasing its utility to ε+m(k − 1) +m(`− 1).
• More than one node is ON. Here, there is at
least one pair of nodes (i, j) in {1, . . . , k} connected
via Chicken Gadget in the (ON,ON) state, thus
receiving undesirable cross traffic. This is an un-
stable state, since the utility of every such i and j
will increase by at least m− ε if they turn OFF.
K.7 The TRANSITION Gadget.
Our next building block is the k-Transition Gad-
get , shown in Figure 23. Intuitively, Transition
Gadget resets an k-Selector Gadget from the sta-
ble state i (all nodes in {1, . . . , k} are OFF except node
i) to the stable state j. We do not use the Transition
Gadget directly in our reduction, but a modified ver-
sion of this gadget, called a Triple Transition Gad-
get . For expository purposes, we start with a detailed
explanation of the Transition Gadget .
The Transition Gadget shown in in Figure 23
has three non-fixed nodes: the two selector nodes i, j,
that are attached to an k-Selector Gadget , and
a selector-transition node tij . In addition, k-Selector
Gadget includes the the new fixed nodes aij , bij , cij , eij ,
such that tij has lower AS number than eij , and aij
has lower AS number than bij . Finally, there are three
new customer trees. Override(i,j), and Hold(xi,j), each
wanting to reach destination dj , and And(i,j), that wants
to reach destination di. All destinations, customer trees,
and other fixed nodes except aij are ON; only the fixed
node aij is OFF.
The Transition Gadget guarantees the following.
Lemma K.6. When the k-Transition Gadget is
at stable state i, the network evolves to stable state j
within a constant number of time steps.
Proof. We start by discussing the routes available
for each relevant flow of traffic in the Transition Gad-
get :
• And Traffic. Traffic from And(i,j) to di has a se-
cure provider route (And(i,j) ,eij , cij , di ) and an-
other route (And(i,j) ,tij , i, di ). Since tij has lower
AS number than eij , the latter route is chosen iff
it is secure, i.e., both tij and i are ON. When the
former route is used, neither the selector-transition
node nor the selector node obtain any utility (since
they are not on the route). When the latter route is
used, the selector-transition node tij obtains 30mk-
units of utility (since it receives And traffic along
a provider edge), and the selector node i obtains
no utility (since it receives the And traffic from a
provider).
t b
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Figure 23: States of the Transition Gadget .
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• Override Traffic. Traffic from Override(i,j) to dj
has provider route (Override(i,j), j, dj) and (Over-
ride(i,j), tij , dj). Since j has lower AS number than
tij , the latter route is chosen by Override(i,j) iff
selector-transition node tij is ON and selector node
j is OFF. When the former route is used, selector
node j obtains 10mk units of utility; note that this
is approximately an order of magnitude more util-
ity than j can ever hope to obtain from the Se-
lector Gadget (losing this utility will cause j
to override the Selector Gadget ). Similarly,
tij receives utility 10mk when the latter route is
chosen.
• Hold Traffic. Traffic from Hold(i,j) to tij has
provider route (Hold(i,j), aij , tij , dj) and (Hold(i,j), bij , tij , dj).
Since aij has lower AS number than bij , the latter
route is chosen by Hold(i,j) iff it is secure, i.e., the
selector-transition node tij is ON. When the for-
mer route is used, selector-transition node tij ob-
tains 20mk units of utility, since it receives Hold
traffic from its customer. When the latter route is
used, tij receives this traffic from its peer, and thus
obtains no utility.
Notice also that the utility of selector node i is not af-
fected by any of the customer tress in the Transition
Gadget , so that its behavior will be completely domi-
nated by the Selector Gadget . Meanwhile, selector
node j is only affected by the Transition Gadget
when j loses Override traffic (when j is OFF and tij
is ON). Since the utility obtained from Override traf-
fic dominates the utility obtained from the Selector
Gadget , j has an incentive to turn ON regardless
of the state of the Selector Gadget . Finally, tij ’s
behavior is completely determined by the state of the
Transition Gadget .
The idea of the Transition Gadget , is that if the
Selector Gadget is set to a particular state (i.e.,
state i), the selector-transition node turns ON, and causes
a reset of the Selector Gadget . We start with the
following proposition, that argues that the Transition
Gadget will not turn on “by mistake”.
Proposition K.7. Node tij turns ON iff node i is
ON.
Proof. This follows straight-forwardly from our dis-
cussion of routes and utilities above. If node i is ON,
tij turns ON to attract the And traffic for 30mk-units
of utility, which exceed the utility tij could obtain by
remaining OFF (namely, 20mk-units of utility from the
Hold traffic). For the other direction, suppose node i is
OFF, and so tij cannot attract the And traffic. Then,
if tij is OFF, it obtains 20mk-units of utility from the
Hold traffic, which exceeds the maximum utility tij can
obtain by turning ON (namely, 10mk of utility from the
Override traffic).
Next, we show how the Transition Gadget pro-
gresses from a state where only i is ON, to a state where
only j is ON. To do this, we present Figure 23, which
depicts each of the five phases of the Transition Gad-
get , and Table 6 presents the utility of each non-fixed
node in each phase of the Transition Gadget . Fig-
ure 23 and Table 6 follow from the discussion of routes
and utility above, so we omit a detailed arguments of
their correctness. Note that the node that wishes to
change its action in each stage is shown in bold in Ta-
ble 6.
Transition Gadget is a three-(non-fixed)-node gad-
get, and so the proof follows by from arguing the node
that moves after each phase has an incentive to change
its action, and turn ON or OFF, while the node that
does not move has no such incentive. (Note that the
former holds also by inspection of Table 6). We do this
now:
23(a) Initial (ON,OFF,OFF) stage. Here tij wishes to
change its action; by turning ON, it can attract
both the And and the Override traffic, which is of
higher utility than the Hold traffic it attracts by
staying OFF. Also, j is does not wish to change
its action; this follows from the fact that j attracts
Override traffic regardless of its state; thus, the
properties of the Selector Gadget maintain j
in the OFF state.x
23(b) (ON,OFF,ON) stage. Here j is wishes to change
its action; in this state it has lost the Override traf-
fic; thus j wants to turn ON to get it back (even
though doing this will take the Selector Gadget
out of a selector stable state). Also, i does not wish
to change its action; since i’s utility is not affected
by the trafxfic flows in the Transition Gadget ,
the properties of the Selector Gadget maintain
i in the ON state.
23(c) (ON,ON,ON) stage. Here i wishes to change its
action; i’s behavior is completely determined by the
Selector Gadget , which is currently not in a
stable state. From the properties of the Selector
Gadget , i has an incentive to turn OFF. Also, tij
does not wish to change its action; even though tij
is only attracting And traffic (thus obtaining 30mk-
units of utility), this is still more than the utility it
would obtain by turning OFF and attracting only
Hold traffic (for 20mk-units of utility).
23(c) (OFF,ON,ON) stage. Here tij wishes to change
its action; tij no longer attracts the And traffic
(since i is off) and it is losing the Hold traffic as
well (because tij is ON). Thus, tij has an incentive
to turn OFF in order to attract the Hold traffic.
Also, j is does not wis to change its action; it is
in a selector stable state and is attracting Override
traffic as well.
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Figure state utility of i utility of j utility of tij
i j tij Selector Selector Transition Transition
Fig. 23(a) ON OFF OFF m(k + i− 2) + ε m(k + j − 2) +10mk 20mk
Fig. 23(b) ON OFF ON m(k + i− 2) + ε m(k + j − 2) +0 40mk
Fig. 23(c) ON ON ON m(k + i− 3) + ε m(k + j − 3) + ε +10mk 30mk
Fig. 23(d) OFF ON ON m(k + i− 2) m(k + j − 2) + ε +10mk 0
Fig. 23(e) OFF ON OFF m(k + i− 2) m(k + j − 2) + ε +10mk 20mk
Table 6: States of the Transition Gadget .
23(e) (OFF,ON,ON) stage. We have finally arrived at
a stable state; the Selector Gadget is in the se-
lector stable state j, so i is does not wish to change
its action. Furthermore, j is attracting its Override
traffic, so j is does not wish to change its action as
well. Finally, tij does not wish to change its ac-
tion; by staying OFF, tij can attract only Hold
traffic (thus obtaining 20mk-units of utility), but
this is still more than the utility it would obtain
by turning ON and attracting only Override traffic
(for only 10mk-units of utility).
We can now derive the following proposition from the
discussion above.
Proposition K.8. If selector-transition node tij turns
ON, then the r-selector is set to state j.
Combining Propositions K.7-K.8, it is clear that if
i 6= j, the i→ æ r-Transition Gadget can reset the
r-Selector Gadget from state i to state j.
K.8 Combining Multiple TRANSITION Gad-
gets for a Given SELECTOR.
Thus far, we have argued only about a single i →
j Transition Gadget (for given i, j); we now con-
sider arbitrarily resetting the Selector Gadget from
any state to any other state. We present the following
proposition.
Proposition K.9. If we attach a single k-Transition
Gadget from each node i ∈ {1, . . . , k} to each other
node j 6= i in an k-Selector Gadget , then each
i → j Transition Gadget can move the Selector
Gadget from selector stable state i to the selector sta-
ble state j.
Proof. Figure 24 shows how the Transition Gad-
get is attached to arbitrary nodes i and j of the Selec-
tor Gadget . It is easy to see that adding Transi-
tion Gadget to the Selector Gadget does not in-
troduce any customer-provider loops; individual Tran-
sition Gadget have no customer-provider loops, and
since each Transition Gadget has its own indepen-
dent selector-transition node, that may only be directly
connected a single selector node (i.e., node i in Fig-
ure 24), adding multiple Transition Gadget to a Se-















1/3 K transition gadget  - how to connecting the Gadgets together
Notice how tij is not going to introduce any GR loops between selector players since it’s only
Figure 24: Transition Ga get between nodes i, j
of Selector Gadget
loops. Suppose the selector is set to state i. Each selec-
tor node is attached to its own, independent selector-
transition node, and thus by Proposition K.7, only the
selector-transition node attached to node i will turn
ON. Finally, by Proposition K.8, we have that the Se-
lector Gadget will be reset to state ji.
K.9 Triple Transition Gadget .
The final element of our reduction requires us to be
able to simulatively reset three independent Selector
Gadget from state 〈i1, i2, i3〉 to states 〈j1, j2, j3〉.
The Triple Transition Gadget ‘AND’s together
three Transition Gadget , using a similar trick to
that used in the And Gadget . The idea is to connect
three Selector Gadget to a single selector-transition
node, and to ensure that the selector-transition node
turns ON (i.e., moves from the first phase of the Tran-
sition Gadget ,(ON,OFF,OFF) in Figure 23(a)), to
the second stage ((ON,OFF,ON) in Figure 23(c))) iff all
three of the Selector Gadget are set to the correct
states 〈i1, i2, i3〉.
K.9.1 Constructing the Triple Transition Gad-
get .
Figure 26 presents an overview of the Triple Tran-
sition Gadget . We have three independent Selec-
tor Gadget that are not considered part of the Triple
Transition Gadget ; a k1-Selector Gadget , a
k2-Selector Gadget , and a k3-Selector Gadget
30
tp bijℓ



















1/3 K transition gadget  - how to connecting the Gadgets together
Figure 25: 13k-Transition GadgetTransition Gadget Schematic
– 1/3 transition gadget has AND converted to 140k ε k=max(k1,k2,k3)
TOTAL HOLD-BIG = –300kε (traffic tp gets by turning on alone, without i1,i2,i3)          
Only 1 on:  tp gets (140-300)k ε;  2 guys on: tp gets (280-300)kε; 4 guys on: tp gets(420-300)kε; 























































Figure 26: Schematic of Triple Transition Gad-
get
. Each Selector Gadget has its respective selector
nodes, i1, j1, i2, j2, i3, j3. The selector nodes associated
with each Selector Gadget are connected to the sin-
gle selector-transition node, tp via a modified Transi-
tion Gadget , which we call a 13k-Transition Gad-
get and depict in Figure 25. As shown in Figure 25,
the 13k-Transition Gadget is identical to the Tran-
sition Gadget , with the modification that the And
traffic from a single 13k-Transition Gadget is not
sufficient to turn ON the selector-transition node tp.
As usual, we use standard tricks to ensure that in-
terconnecting the gadgets this way does not introduce
new traffic flows through the gadgets that affect nodes’
actions. Notice also that interconnecting the gadgets
this way cannot introduce any new customer-provider
loops; this follows from the fact that the individual gad-
gets have no customer provider loops, and are inter-
connected solely through the selector-transition node
tp (see Figure 26), and the selector-transition node is
always a provider or a peer of every node in the gadget
(see Figure 25).
K.9.2 Why it works.
The key to why the gadget works lies in the fact
that the And traffic from each 13k-Transition Gad-
get now provides only 12mk-units of utility, so that
all three selector nodes i1, i2, i3 must be ON before the
selector-transition node t(i1, i2, i3) turns ON:
Lemma K.10. Node t(i1, i2, i3) turns ON iff nodes
i1, i2, i3 are all ON.
Proof. Recall that traffic And(i1, j1)provides util-
ity to the transition node t(i1, i2, i3) iff both i1 and
t(i1, i2, i3) are on. We start with the reverse direc-
tion. If only two of selector nodes (i1, i2, i3) are ON,
the selector-transition node can receive at most (12mk+
10mk) + (12mk + 10mk) + 10mk = 54mk-units of util-
ity by turning ON (attracting And traffic from two
1
3k-Transition Gadget , and Override traffic from
each of the three 13k-Transition Gadget ). Mean-
while, if the tp is OFF, it obtains least 20mk ∗ 3 =
60mk-units of utility be attracting Hold traffic from
each of the 13k-Transition Gadget , so in this case
the selector-transition node has an incentive to remain
OFF. For the forward direction, if all three selector
nodes (i1, i2, i3) are ON, the selector-transition node
earns utility (12mk+10mk)∗3 = 66mk by turning ON,
which exceeds the 60mk-units of utility the selector-
transition node could obtain by remaining OFF.
An argument similar to that of Proposition K.8 gives
us:
Lemma K.11. If i1 6= j1, i2 6= j2, i3 6= j3, then if
t(i1, i2, i3) turns ON, then nodes j1, j2, j3 all turn ON.
K.9.3 What happens if i` = j`?
Our reduction may also require that we reset the
three Selector Gadget from states 〈i1, i2, i3〉 to state
〈j1, j2, j3〉, where some i` = j`. Modifying the Triple
Transition Gadget to do this is simple; we need only
remove the Override traffic from the appropriate 13k-
Transition Gadget , and reduce the Hold traffic to
10mk (see Figure 25).It is not hard to see that this will
ensure that the selector-transition node turns ON iff
the three Selector Gadget are set to 〈i1, i2, i3〉 (i.e.,
analogous to Lemma K.10), without requiring a reset of
the `th Selector Gadget gadget. Thus, by applying
this modification to the Triple Transition Gadget
whenever some i` = j`, we have the following, stronger
version of Lemma K.11:
Lemma K.12. If t(i1, i2, i3) turns ON, then nodes j1, j2, j3
all turn ON.
K.9.4 Multiple Triple Transition Gadget .
Finally, we argue that we can have multiple Triple
Transition Gadget that can simultaneously reset three
selectors from any state to any other state.
Lemma K.13. Suppose we have at least three Selec-
tor Gadget , and consider triplets of selector nodes
(i1, i2, i3), where each selector node belongs to a differ-
ent k`-Selector Gadget , and k` ≤ k. Then, for
every such triplet of selector node (i1, i2, i3), we can
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attach a single k-Triple Transition Gadget that
moves each of the three k`-Selector Gadget from
state i` to state j`.
Proof. Each triplet of selector nodes is attached to
a unique selector-transition node t(i1, i2, i3), and we use
standard tricks to ensure that non-designated does not
flow into the gadgets and affect nodes’ decisions. Thus,
we can apply Lemma K.10 and Lemma K.12 in argu-
ment that is analogous to the one used to prove Propo-
sition K.9.
K.10 Concluding the proof.
We are now ready to present our reduction. Given
an input to STATIC-MODE, we construct a network
in S*BGP ADOPTION. Recall that the set of nodes
in S*BGP ADOPTION contains of r head nodes, q
machine-state nodes, and k cell clusters, each contain-
ing γ symbol nodes. We construct a k-Selector Gad-
get for the head nodes, a q-Selector Gadget for the
machine-nodes, a γ-Selector Gadget for the symbol
nodes in each of the cell clusters. Intuitively, this guar-
antees that, throughout the evolution of the network,
in each of these subsets of nodes, only a single node is
ON.
We construct, for every cell cluster Ci, a Triple
Transition Gadget that connects the Selector Gad-
get for the head nodes, the Selector Gadget for the
machine-state nodes and the selector for the specific cell
cluster Ci. The Triple Transition Gadget guaran-
tees the transition between triplets of stable states for
the selectors as follows. When the head node hi (that
is, the head node that corresponds to the cell cluster
Ci) is ON, a machine-state node sβ is ON, and a sym-
bol node (in Ci) gß,σ is ON, the Triple Transition
Gadget makes the three Selector Gadget transi-
tion to a state where the head node ON, the machine-
state node ON, and the symbol node in Ci ON are the
nodes corresponding to the outcome of δ(i, β, σ) in the
Turing machine M . Thus, the different Triple Tran-
sition Gadget capture the transitions prescribed by
the Turing machine’s transition function.
Recall that a state of the network in S*BGP ADOP-
TION is “clean” if only a single head node h is using
S-BGP (is ON), only a single machine-state node s is
ON, and only a single node gi in every cell-cluster Ci is
ON. Observe that every clean state in S*BGP ADOP-
TION captures a configuration of the Turing machine
M is STATIC-MODE (in which the index of the single
head node using S-BGP is the location of M ’s head,
and so on). We make the following observation that
immediately follows from our construction:
Observation K.14. A configuration c in STATIC-
MODE is static iff the clean state of the network in
S*BGP ADOPT that corresponds to c is stable.
We set the initial state of the network in S*BGP
ADOPTION to be the clean state in which the single
head node ON is h1; the single state node ON is the
node that represents q0; and in each cell cluster Ci, the
single symbol node ON is gi,xi . Observe that this clean
state in S*BGP ADOPTION captures the initial con-
figuration of M (the head is pointing to the first cell,
that contains x1, and the machine-state is the initial
machine-state q0).
The correctness of the reduction follows from the fol-
lowing observation about our construction.
Observation K.15. From every clean state α in S*BGP
ADOPTION that represents a configuration c = (h, s, g)
in STATIC-MODE, the network evolves (within a con-
stant number of time steps) to another clean state that
represents the configuration that immediately follows c
in STATIC-MODE (after applying δ).
Thus, we show that when starting at an initial state
of the network as described above, the network evolu-
tion essentially mimics the execution of M for the input
string x. Theorem K.1 follows.
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